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Discrimination and Dignity
Denise G. R~aume°
INTRODUCTION
Canadian equality jurisprudence in the Charter' era has been
marked from the beginning by its rejection of a formal equality
approach in favor of the pursuit of substantive equality. However, it
has turned out to be easier to avoid a pure formal equality approach
than to articulate the substance of substantive equality. If the
guarantee of equality is to go beyond the Dicean objective of
ensuring that all those covered by the terms of a rule receive the
benefit of inclusion, there must be criteria determining when
statutory distinctions between persons are legitimate and when they
are not. The development of these criteria presents not only
significant conceptual difficulties but, perhaps more importantly,
moral and political ones. Equality should not be an empty ideal, but
if we expect the courts to supervise the various distributive tasks that
occupy the modem state, how should they distribute benefits and
burdens?
The right to equality2 is not like other constitutional rights. With
the right to vote, to free expression, to a fair trial, or to freedom from
unreasonable search, we can readily identify a human interest or
Copyright 2003, by LOUISIANA LAW REVIEW.
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The development of this article has benefitted from many forms of support
and many kinds of help. The opportunity to visit the College of Law at the
University of Saskatchewan as the Law Foundation Chair gave me the luxury to
carry out the research necessary, as well as a warm and collegial environment in
which to do so. I have also benefitted from the chance to present earlier versions
of this work both at the University of Saskatchewan and the University of Victoria,
as well as at the conference at the Louisiana State University Law School which
gave rise to this symposium issue. In addition, I am grateful for individual
feedback from Donna Greschner, Ken Norman, and Hester Lessard and
encouragement from Colleen Sheppard. Lastly, thanks must also go out to Zoe
Oxaal for her meticulous research assistance.
1. Canadian Charter ofRights and Freedoms, Part 1 of the Constitution Act,
1982, being Schedule B of the Canada Act, 1982 (U.K.), 1982, c. 11.
2. Section 15(1) of the Charter provides that "[e]very individual is equal
before and under the law and has the right to the equal protection and equal benefit
of the law without discrimination and, in particular, without discrimination based
on race, national or ethnic origin, colour, religion, sex, age or mental or physical
disability." All rights in the Charter are subject to s. 1, which provides: "The
Canadian Charter ofRights and Freedoms guarantees the rights and freedoms set
out in it subject only to such reasonable limits prescribed by law as can be
demonstrably justified in a free and democratic society."
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cluster of interests that lies at the heart of the right which guides
judicial interpretation of its contours. This is not to say that there is
no controversy about the understanding and scope of these interests,
but at least the participants in the debate are working from the same
map. By contrast, it is not clear that we have any handle on what
human interest underlies the right to equality. Without one, Dicey's
pull is likely to be strong, and equality protections will do little more
than correct glaring deviations from the terms of statutory rules
themselves. Developing a conception of such an interest should help
in formulating appropriate obligations to impose on government to
secure that interest.
In this article, I examine the recent efforts of the Supreme Court
of Canada to develop a substantive conception of equality through the
invocation of the value of human dignity. The process of naming
dignity as the touchstone of equality analysis has been laborious. The
process of giving that concept some meaningful content stands as
perhaps the most significant challenge facing the Court in the coming
years. This turn toward dignity in Canadian equality jurisprudence
has come in for a great deal of criticism.' Dignity is said to be vague
to the point of vacuous and, therefore, too easily useable to dress up
decisions based on nothing more than conservative gut reaction or
excessive deference to Parliament. Recent cases4 might be thought
to bear out this criticism. There is no doubt that dignity can be used
as an empty place-holder for other less presentable reasons for
finding or refusing to find a violation of equality. But since I shall
argue that some substantive interest or value must underpin s. 15 if
it is to have any critical bite at all, the job of articulating that interest
cannot be avoided.5 Although a great deal of work needs to be done
in fleshing out a concept of dignity capable of filling this role, the
Court is on the right track in latching onto dignity as the substantive
concept informing equality rights. Rather than join the critics, I
propose to work with what has already been said about what dignity
means to see what constructive work it might do.6
3. See, for example, Peter W. Hogg, Constitutional Law of Canada,
52-26-52-27 (4th ed. 1997); Sheilah Martin, Balancing Individual Rights to
Equality and Social Goods, 80 Can. Bar Rev. 299, 328-30 (2001); June Ross, A
Flawed Synthesis of the Law, 11 Const. Forum 74, 83 (2000); Roger Gibbins, How
in the World Can You Contest Equal Human Dignity, 12 N.J.C.L. 25 (2000-2001).
4. Seefor example, Gosselin v. Quebec (Attorney General), [2002] S.C.C. 84.
5. Donna Greschner, Does Law Advance the Cause ofEquality?, 27 Queen's
L.J. 299, 306 (2001).
6. In analyzing the case law, I will take a somewhat broad brush approach-in
particular, I will not do justice to the debate about the proper division of labor
between s. 15 and s. 1 of the Charter. For purposes of this argument, I accept the
trend in the case law toward doing at least some of the work of determining the
limits of the right to equality within s. 15 rather than leaving it all to be done under
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A. Putting the 'Substance' in Substantive Equality
The disappointing results of adjudication under the equal rights
clause of the Canadian Bill of Rights7 led to a concerted push after
1982 and the enactment of the Charter of Rights and Freedoms to
convince the Supreme Court to abandon a formal equality approach
in favor of "substantive equality."8 But what exactly is the substance
in substantive equality? To get a handle on this we must go back to
the basics. Equality rights are a means of challenging the existing
distribution of some benefit or burden.9 The point of a claim is to
make an argument that some other principle of entitlement, wider in
at least some respect than that used by the legislature, is the
appropriate criterion for distribution of the benefit at issue.10 Every
distribution requires the setting of criteria that govern that
distribution. Defining criteria in a rule automatically gives rise to a
form of equality-anyone who has not received the benefit but
the rubric of determining what are the limits on rights demonstrably justifiable in
a free and democratic society, the criteria provided by s. 1.
7. The Canadian Bill of Rights, S.C. 1960, c. 44, reprinted in R.S.C. 1985,
App. III, was an ordinary statute adopted by the federal government in 1960.
Although the courts occasionally treated it as having quasi-constitutional status, the
fact that it was not entrenched, combined with the conservatism of the bench, meant
that it was often interpreted in a way that was extremely deferential toward
Parliament. This was especially so with the equality provision, which guaranteed
"equality before the law without discrimination on the basis of" various designated
characteristics. The high water mark of this judicial conservatism was reached in
the sex equality case A.G. Canada v. Lavell, [1974] S.C.R. 1349, in which the
Supreme Court of Canada held that a provision of the Indian Act which deprived
only Indian women of their status under the Act upon marriage to a non-Indian did
not violate the Bill of Rights because the law applied equally to all those, Indian
women, at whom it was directed. Five years later, the Court decided in Bliss v.
A.G. Canada, [ 1979] 1 S.C.R. 183 that a provision of the Unemployment Insurance
Act making regular sick leave benefits unavailable for work absences caused by
pregnancy and confining pregnant women to more restrictive benefits did not deny
equality before the law because it treated all "pregnant persons" alike. For a brief
history of this case law, see Walter S. Tamopolsky, The Equality Rights (Ss. 15, 27
and 28), in The Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms: Commentary 395
(Walter S. Tamopolsky & Gerald A. Beaudoin eds., 1982); Beverley Baines,
Women, Human Rights andthe Constitution, in Women and the Constitution 31-63
(A. Doerr & M. Carrier eds. 1981).
8. Gwen Brodsky and Shelagh Day, Canadian Charter Equality Rights for
Women: One Step Forward or Two Steps Back? 185ff (1989).
9. For the sake of brevity, henceforth I will use "benefit" to refer to both
benefits and burdens, since relief from a burden can be conceived of as a benefit.
10. Isaiah Berlin, Equality as an Ideal, in Justice and Social Policy 134-35
(Frederick A. Olafson ed., 1961) describes such a claim as pointing out the
"unfairness" of the existing distribution, an argument grounded in the value of
equality, as opposed to criticizing it for violating some other value, such as the
promotion of virtue or happiness, not necessarily tending toward greater equality.
2003] 647
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fulfills the criteria has not been treated equally." In this sense,
equality is a side-effect or by-product of the proper application of any
rule, whatever that rule is. The disappointment in the Canadian Bill
of Rights jurisprudence arose out of the Supreme Court's tendency
fairly automatically to accept as justified the criteria provided by the
legislation under challenge--equality was conceived of as a matter
of treating likes alike and the legislation itself was allowed to
determine what counted as alike for its purposes. This idea is what
has been labeled 'formal equality'-it is received wisdom in Canada
now that this is not good enough as an approach to s. 15.2
If the legislature's criteria for distribution are unsatisfactory, what
should replace them? What would a vision of substantive equality
require? Substantive equality pays attention to the actual conditions
of life of members of disadvantaged groups-rules creating, or
exacerbating, or perhaps simply not correcting background
inequalities should be changed, even if they distribute some benefit
equally within their own four comers. Such an approach requires a
theory as to which background conditions of inequality require
attention in our society, which in turn requires an account of the
respects in which people should be equal. In other words, we need
to know what underlying universal entitlements there are-what
goods or benefits each person is entitled to share in. Once these are
known, equality inheres in applying the principles that govern those
entitlements. If every person is entitled to the satisfaction of her
needs, then someone whose needs are not satisfied has not been
treated equally; if every person is entitled to the means of
subsistence, then someone who is lacking those means is not being
treated equally, etc. More concrete rules providing access to pension
benefits or medical attention, for instance, can be assessed according
to whether they are conducive to the satisfaction of needs or the
provision of the means of subsistence, etc. Thus, substantive equality
appeals to some set of underlying principles specifying a range of
benefits that are properly distributed universally. 4 Its conception of
11. Id. at 132.
12. Andrews v. Law Soc'y of B.C., [1989] 1 S.C.R. 143.
13. For example, Kathleen A. Lahey succinctly states the approach as follows:
"the evaluation of sex equality challenges would require judges to ask whether the
rule or practice that is being challenged contributes to the actual inequality of
women, and whether changing the rule or practice will actually produce an
improvement in the specific material conditions of the specific woman or women
before them." Kathleen A. Lahey, Feminist Theories of (In)Equality, in Equality
and Judicial Neutrality 83 (Sheilah L. Martin & Kathleen Mahoney eds., 1987).
14. Note that the list of benefits covered by such universal principles must be
limited for the theory to be coherent. Since some forms of equal distribution will
deny equality along some other dimension, there is no way to distribute every
benefit and burden equally. For example, the equal satisfaction of need may conflict
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equality is just as formal as that which flows from accepting the
legislature's criteria at face value; it simply relies on different criteria
for allocation of specific benefits--criteria ultimately justified by
reference to underlying universal entitlements.
Indeed, any approach to the adjudication of equality rights that
does not simply insist on the application of the challenged legislation
according to its own terms must ultimately rely on an argument that
an alternative criterion of distribution is better than the one provided
by the legislature. This is true even of approaches that focus
exclusively on assessing the adequacy of the legislative distinction as
a means of achieving legislative objectives.' In the first instance,
this approach hinges on determining the legislative objective, a
matter that can itself be a matter of controversy and which is merely
an oblique way of prescribing criteria for the distribution of the
benefit in issue. An objective of alleviating poverty will carry
different implications for the distribution of social assistance than an
objective of encouraging self-sufficiency. Furthermore, if there is to
be any room to challenge the legitimacy of the legislative objective
(without which we are back to Dicey), these will hinge on some
argument that there is some universal principle of entitlement, some
respect in which people are entitled to be treated equally, which is not
satisfied by the actual objective.
In other words, the truly substantive question in the context of
how to distribute various goods is that of determining the proper
criteria for each benefit likely to come up for distribution in a modern
society, taking into account the need to redress existing inequalities.
The task is a daunting one, considered comprehensively, quickly
leading us into debates about whether it is the proper province of the
judiciary. While dramatic redistribution in various ways is
undoubtedly called for in our society, it remains intensely
with equality of resources. A theory of substantive equality must specify the
benefits over which it ranges, mindful of the fact that the wider its swath, the more
likely conflict will arise between competing aspirations toward equality.
15. For an example of this kind of approach, see David M. Beatty, The
Canadian Conception ofEquality, 46 U. Toronto L.J. 349 (1996). Although Beatty
appears to adopt the rather radical view that all goods should be divided equally
making every legislative distinction a violation of s. 15, in the final analysis, by
incorporating the s. 1 analysis of whether the legislative means are calibrated to its
ends, he effectively ends up with an account of equality that holds that "gratuitous"
distinctions should not be made between people in distributing benefits. Such
approaches can vary from weak to strong depending on how tight the connection
they insist on between legislative means and end. At the weaker end of the
spectrum, advocates require only that there be some rational connection, that the
means used bear some relationship to the objectives sought, and the objectives be
permissible. Versions with more teeth require that the means be necessary, or
virtually so, to the achievement of an important objective.
2003] 649
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controversial what is the best comprehensive theory of distributive
justice.' 6 Grappling with this question is the central concern of
government. To make sense of Charter equality provisions, we must
articulate a role for the courts in assessing distributive criteria that
allows for critically assessing existing criteria, but does not simply
shift full responsibility for such distributive questions from the
legislature to the courts.
Thus, a substantive equality approach to the adjudication of
constitutional equality claims must be a principled approach to
determining when the legislature has mistaken the principle of
entitlement appropriate to some benefit, an approach that provides a
reason for widening the criteria of entitlement at least somewhat. I
am not sure this yields a different conception of equality, that is, a
'substantive' one, but it does suggest that we look for a substantive
foundation for equality analysis-a set of values or human interests
that can tell us when and why entitlement criteria are too narrow,
given the benefit in issue. We do not have ready to hand a
comprehensive theory of the interests that ground universal
entitlements. We should expect, then, that courts will proceed
cautiously in assessing the adequacy of existing criteria for
distribution of benefits. As they deal with cases, one by one, they
should be feeling their way toward the articulation of universal
entitlements which can be regarded as foundational and against
which legislation can be assessed.
The survey of Canadian equality jurisprudence sketched in the
next section shows the Supreme Court gradually coming to the
realization that if legislative criteria cannot be accepted at face value,
there must be some substantive value capable of telling us which
criteria are illegitimate, why, and what they should be replaced with.
The jurisprudence has finally settled on the interest in dignity as the
underlying value. The identification of human dignity as a value
operates as the basis for the articulation of a universal entitlement to
respect for that dignity. The distribution of concrete benefits can
therefore be judged according to whether they are consistent with the
respect each is equally owed. This allows the courts to begin to
develop a more comprehensive theory of equality suitable to
enforcement through constitutional rights protections. In some
measure, virtually everyone will agree that the dignity of each person
should be respected. Through grappling with the specific issues
raised by the cases, we can hope that the concept of dignity will grow
organically in accordance with our best critically reflective
judgments about what is most important to people, as individuals, as
16. For just a taste of the complexities, see Ronald M. Dworkin, Sovereign
Virtue: The Theory and Practice of Equality (2000).
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members of communities, and as participants in society. In
participating in this process, courts will be contributing to the
ongoing debate about the role of equality in our political culture.
FUMBLING TOWARD DIGNITY: THE FIRST DECADE OF EQUALITY
JURISPRUDENCE
As early as Andrews v. Law Society of British Columbia,"7 the
Supreme Court's first attempt to provide a test for the violation of s.
15(1), some implicit grasp of the need for a substantive foundation
for equality rights is only dimly apparent. Andrews struck down a
provision restricting access to the British Columbia Bar to Canadian
citizens. Andrews was a British subject who had immigrated to
Canada and was faced with a three year hiatus in his legal career
while he waited for his residency period to pass before he was
eligible become a Canadian citizen. In quickly pointing out that not
every legislative distinction is discriminatory, requiring justification
under s. 1 to be upheld, 8 the Court gestured toward the need for
criteria to distinguish discriminatory distinctions from non-
discriminatory ones. In one move apparently designed to respond to
this need, the Court declared that courts should have regard to the
impact of legislation on those affected in determining whether there
is discrimination. This assertion was hailed as a major victory by
those desperate to ensure that s. 15 jurisprudence not collapse into the
aridity of formal equality.19 However, since every piece of legislation
has some impact which leaves some better off than others (just as all
legislation distinguishes between classes of persons), an injunction
to have regard to impact merely pushes the inquiry back one level -
what kind of impact discriminates, or inflicts a 'real' disadvantage,
and what kind does not?
The Court's initial answer to this question focused on whether the
distinction used is based on a "special characteristic" of the claimant.
This close attention to the basis of the legislative distinction, labeled
the "grounds approach," suggests that tying a burden to certain
personal characteristics itself constitutes the sort of impact about
which s. 15 is concerned. An approach of this sort is straightforward
as long as the personal characteristics whose use is illegitimate are
clear. S. 15 lists several such characteristics, but in Andrews itself
the Court decided that this list is not exhaustive--other
17. [1989] 1 S.C.R. 143.
18. Id. at 168.
19. N. Colleen Sheppard, Recognition of the Disadvantaging of Women: The
Promise ofAndrews v. Law Society of British Columbia, McGill L.J. 207, 211-18
(1989); Day and Brodsky, Canadian Charter Equality Rights for Women, supra
note 8, at 205-07.
2003]
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discriminatory grounds could be added on the basis of their
analogous character. Treating the list as open-ended requires some
means of determining what makes an unlisted characteristic
analogous. To provide a deeper foundation for this approach, we
need a theory about why some grounds are enumerated in the Charter
as potentially problematic bases for legislative distinctions or effects,
which can, in turn, provide a basis for declaring other, unmentioned
grounds to be analogous. The need for a substantive foundation was
not initially widely realized. Instead, many seemed to assume that
necessary and sufficient conditions for the recognition of analogous
grounds could be produced through a purely conceptual analysis of
the common features of the grounds listed in s. 15.20 That has turned
out to be a false hope, as the search for conceptual solutions to
normative questions usually is.
For a brief moment in the wake of Andrews, without a great deal
of thought having been given to what makes a new ground analogous,
it looked as though the Court was going to define equality rights
exclusively in terms of an expandable list of 'special characteristics'
which were to be treated simply as prohibited bases for legislative
distinction. The rule coming out of Andrews, and evidently relied on
soon after in McKinney v. The University of Guelph,21 has typically
been summarized as holding that a claimant may establish
discrimination by showing disadvantage based on a ground
enumerated in s. 15 or analogous thereto, whether by explicit design
or in effect.22 It soon became clear, though, that the Court not only
did not want to render every legislative distinction unconstitutional
(subject to s. 1 rescue), it did not even want to rule out every
distinction explicitly relying on an enumerated ground.23 Thus some
20. Thus, for example, Peter Hogg's analysis of the analogous groundjurisprudence fastens onto the element of immutability as the conceptual common
link between all the enumerated grounds in s. 15. Peter W. Hogg, Constitutional
Law of Canada 52-29-52-35 (4th ed. 1997).
21. [1990] 3 S.C.R. 229. McKinney dealt with whether a statutory permission
to private sector employers to impose mandatory retirement at age 65 constituted
a violation of s. 15. A majority held that since the legislation made a clear
distinction on the basis of age, an enumerated characteristic, and mandatory
retirement could be experienced as a disadvantage, the s. 15 test was met.
However, the Court upheld the legislation under s. 1
22. See, for example, Hogg, supra note 3, at 52-16.1-52-19.
23. See, for example, R. v. Hess, [1990] 2 S.C.R. 906, and Weatherall v.
Canada, [1993] 2 S.C.R. 872, in both of which it was held that a distinction on the
basis of sex was not discriminatory-the former involving a Criminal Code
provision specifying that only men can be guilty of the offence of statutory rape,
and the latter deciding that a prohibition on male prison guards performing frisk
searches of female prisoners while female prison guards were not restricted from
performing such searches on male prisoners is not discriminatory. Note, though,
that in Weatherall, the Court hedged its bets, finding merely that is it "doubtful"
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further argument is needed to determine when use of a characteristic
is justified even though it is on the list of protected characteristics.
In other words, the Court quickly settled into the view that only those
distinctions that are based on an enumerated or analogous ground and
are discriminatory are prohibited by s. 15. This takes us back to the
search for particular kinds of effects, as yet still unidentified and
explained, that violate equality as distinguished from those that do
not, however negative their consequences.
It is frequently argued that this development in the jurisprudence
has reduced the scope of equality rights.2 But if purely conceptual
conditions for recognizing analogous grounds are unavailable, a
requirement that a distinction be discriminatory is the natural
consequence of the need for a substantive foundation to explain when
new analogous grounds should be recognized.2 5 Whatever value
that the rules about cross-gender frisking were discriminatory (at 877), and holding
that they would be justified under s. I in any event. In Hess, while the dissent
followed the 'grounds approach' strictly, finding that the statutory rape provision
was a violation of s. 15 simply because it distinguished in a disadvantaging way on
the basis of an enumerated ground, the majority held that there was no infringement
of s. 15 despite the use of sex in defining the criteria for criminal liability for this
offence (the dissent nevertheless held that the violation of s. 15 was justified under
s. 1, beginning what has come to be a constant pattern of confusion about which
considerations belong under the s. 15 analysis and which under s. 1). Another case
illustrating that a finding of discrimination is more complicated than determining
that a distinction was based on an enumerated characteristic is R. v. Swain, [1991]
1 S.C.R. 933. Here the Court found no violation of equality in a rule allowing the
Crown to decline to prosecute an insane accused in favour of pursuing a trial simply
on the issue of insanity with the result that a finding of insanity would leave the
accused open to detention indefinitely in a psychiatric facility rather than subject
to a fixed sentence as would result from an ordinary conviction. The rule clearly
distinguished on the basis of an enumerated characteristic-mental disability-but
the Court found that indefinite detention under these circumstances did not
constitute a disadvantage. Furthermore, reading s. 15(1) as a prohibition of the use
of certain characteristics would have required s. 15(2) to be read as an equally
categorical exception to that rule. S. 15(2) provides "[S]ubsection (1) does not
preclude any law, program or activity that has as its object the amelioration of
conditions of disadvantaged individuals or groups including those that are
disadvantaged because of race, national or ethnic origin, colour, religion, sex, age
or mental or physical disability."
24. Daniel Proulx, Les droits a l'galitg revus et corriggs par la Cour supreme
du Canada dans l'arrit Law : un pas en avant ou un pas en arri~re, 61 R. du B.
185, 234-35 (2001); Ross, supra note 3; Hogg, supra note 3.
25. For an alternative explanation of the trajectory of the early case law, see
Daniel Proulx, Le concept de dignitg et son usage en context de discrimination:
deux Chartes, deux modiles, 63 R. du B. 485, 502-13 (2003). Proulx treats the
emergence of a substantive condition that a legislative distinction must violate
dignity in order to be in violation of s. 15 as designed to stave off challenges to
social welfare programs for being underinclusive and as required to explain the
denial of discrimination in Hess and Weatherall. Hess, [1990] 2 S.C.R. 906;
2003] 653
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explains why a new ground should be added may also provide a
reason for thinking that some uses of listed grounds do not actually
conflict with that value. We cannot test this until we have identified
and fleshed out that value, a task ultimately to be carried out using
the interest in human dignity. For now, suffice it to say that the
introduction of the requirement of discrimination may be less a new
threshold requirement of s. 15 than a matter of making explicit a
condition already present.
The two points in the analysis of s. 15 at which controversy tends
to collect-which personal characteristics are illegitimate bases for
legislative distinctions, and what kinds of deprivations or
disadvantaging impacts constitute discrimination-mark the points
at which a substantive foundation for equality analysis is needed. We
might refer to them as the "type of distinction" lens and the "type of
impact" lens for analyzing what constitutes discrimination.2 6 These
two lenses will often seem two sides of the same coin-two
perspectives from which to go about deciding what is the difference
between a discriminatory and a non-discriminatory rule. The use of
a certain type of distinction constitutes a certain kind of harm; the
presence of a certain kind of harm leads us to classify certain
distinctions as impermissible. As the case law has developed, the key
factors in the cases determining whether s. 15 has been violated can
be related to one or both of these aspects of the analysis of an
equality issue. A dignity-based analysis has emerged as their ground.
In Andrews, a small start is made in providing the necessary
substantive foundation for equality analysis. The argument operates
through the lens of considering whether citizenship is a personal
characteristic whose use is discriminatory. This analysis is
dominated by the question of whether the exclusion based on
citizenship is based on stereotype or prejudice.27 However, the notion
of stereotype is left undeveloped and does not seem to inform the
analysis of why a restriction to citizens' of access to the legal
profession violates the right to equal protection and benefit of the
law. Indeed, the main s. 15 analysis, penned by McIntyre J., has a
Weatherall, [1993] 2 S.C.R. 872. This sort of explanation seems to me consistent
with mine, but operates on a different plane.
26. Corbi&e v. Canada, [1999] 2 S.C.R. 203, 11.
27. McIntyre J. inAndrews quotes, approvingly Hugessen J.A. in Smith, Kline
& French Labs v. AG Canada (Attorney General), [1987] 2 F.C. 359, 367-69 as
follows: "[t]he inquiry, in effect, concentrates upon the personal characteristics of
those who claim to have been unequally treated. Questions of stereotyping, of
historical disadvantagement, in a word, of prejudice, are the focus and there may
even be a recognition that for some people equality has a different meaning than for
others."
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rather antiseptic and imprecise air.2" There is no close examination
of the stereotype detected in the legislation, nor any analysis of what
makes it so wrong.29 The judgments of Wilson and La Forest J.J.
add a few more clues. Wilson J. focuses on characteristics that
identify groups who "suffer social, political and legal disadvantage
in our society" 30 as picking out means of classification that violate
s. 15. Disadvantage or vulnerability can be indicated by a group's
status as a "discrete and insular minority."31 This analysis seems to
rely on an instinctive grasp of the sorts of group disadvantage that
mark our society, and also assumes that these instincts are widely
shared. However, we need to spell out what is meant by social,
political and legal disadvantage to make this test meaningful. As
long as we are talking about blatant restrictions meant to keep
people of color or women out of certain spheres, the disadvantage
may seem too clear to need much analysis. But once we move into
deciding whether conditioning certain benefits on marital status, or
sexual orientation, or age threatens to "bring about or reinforce...
28. Day and Brodsky, Charter Equality Rights for Women, supra note 8, at
207.
29. The explanation may lay in the fact that McIntyre J., despite his conclusion
that the legislation violated s. 15, would have upheld the legislation under s. 1 as
a reasonable limit demonstrably justified in a free and democratic society. Had he
developed an account of how the use of citizenship as a criterion is based on
stereotype and prejudice, he might have found it harder to find it nevertheless
justified. Indeed, the s. 1 argument wholeheartedly accepts the government's
argument that an insistence on citizenship is a reasonable way to ensure
commitment to the country and adequate acquaintance with the Canadian system
of government, as well as a reasonable condition on access to the privileges of a life
in the law. The implication in the s. 15 analysis that the legislation was grounded
in prejudice and stereotype seems completely negated by the justification offered
under s. 1 - at least if one accepts that justification. That is, the harm done by the
provisions, conceived of as having something to do with the wrong of prejudice, is
not only outweighed by the beneficial purpose, but entirely washed away. In fact,
Maclntyre J.'s s. 15 analysis makes more sense if we locate the violation of
inequality simply in the concrete disadvantage of being denied access to a
profession based on a characteristic closely analogous to specifically prohibited
ones like nationality, that is, just in the making of a distinction on prohibited
grounds. This leaves all the important questions about equality begged- what kind
of disadvantage counts and what kind ofbasis for distinction is impermissible - but
it salvages some intelligibility for McIntyre J.'s division of labor between s. 15 and
s. 1. This is the first hint that there must be something wrong with the way the
division of labor between s. 15 and s. I has been developed. If one did think the
legislation exhibited prejudice, one would be hard pressed to uphold it, and if one
found it completely reasonable under s. 1, how could it be discriminatory to begin
with?
30. Andrews v. Law Soc'y of B.C., [1989] 1 S.C.R. 143, 154.
31. This point adopts the language of the Supreme Court of the United States
in United States v. Carolene Products Co., 304 U.S. 144, 152-53 n.4, 58 S. Ct. 778,
783-84 n.4 (1938).
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disadvantage" in the relevant sense, different judges' intuition tends
to lead them in different directions.
La Forest J. articulates a number of additional factors that help
determine whether a distinction violates "fundamental values .,32 He
points out that citizenship is often at least temporarily beyond the
control of the individual. Although one can choose whether or not to
become a citizen, the residency requirement prevents that choice
from having immediate effect. Second, La Forest J. notes the close
historical connection between citizenship and race, or national or
ethnic origin, as bases on which myriad professions and livelihoods
have in the past been denied to generations of immigrants in a clear
effort to reserve the best jobs for the native-born. His depiction of
the "intolerance '3 3 demonstrated in earlier efforts to marginalize
immigrants gives some life and substance to the reference to
stereotype and prejudice in McIntyre J.'s judgment. Finally, he
points out that citizenship is irrelevant to the qualifications for
admission to the bar. These factors lead him to conclude that such a
basis for distinction would undermine a resident's faith in social and
political institutions and confidence that "[one] can freely and
without obstruction by the state pursue [one's] and [one's] families'
hopes and expectations of vocational and personal development."34
These last remarks point to "personal development," or self-
fulfillment, as a human good that equality rights are designed to
protect. This gives us a start in thinking about what counts as a
disadvantage arising out of legislation that should attract
constitutional attention. But, the state cannot be charged with the
task of ensuring that all its members achieve self-fulfillment. So it
is the irrelevance of the criterion used in the statute, together with its
relative immutability and its use as a tool of exclusion in times past
that makes this an unacceptable obstacle to self-fulfillment.35
The upshot of the early equality cases can be described as
follows: there is something about the use of some kinds of personal
characteristics that can make their use in legislative line drawing
objectionable, but it is not necessarily the case that every use of even
a characteristic explicitly flagged in s. 15 is discriminatory. This tells
us to look for an account of what it is about the use of certain
personal characteristics that constitutes discrimination, or of what
32. Andrews, [1989] 1 S.C.R. at 194.
33. Id. at 195.
34. Id. at 197, quoting Kask v. Shimizu, [1986] 4 W.W.R. 154, at 161, per
McDonald J.
35. La Forest J. sums up his analysis with the comment that those subjected to
such a law would rightly feel that "Canadian society is not free or democratic as far
as they are concerned.... ." Andrews, [1989] 1 S.C.R. at 197, quoting from Kask
v. Shinizu, [1986] 4 W.W.R. 154, 161, per McDonald J.
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kinds of consequences of using such characteristics are
discriminatory ones. As provided by Andrews, the starting point for
such an account is an analysis of the consequences of prejudice and
stereotype. In the early cases, disagreement tended to express itself
more through the analysis of whether a distinction could be justified
under s. 1 rather than whether it was discriminatory, with agreement
on s. 1 justification occasionally papering over the emergence of
diverging opinions on what counts as discrimination.36 However, this
period of relative consensus about the interpretation of s. 15 did not
last long. Deep disagreement about the missing magic ingredient
necessary to convert a characteristic into an analogous ground or to
make the use of an existing ground actually discriminatory was
needed to push the Court to further develop the possible competing
accounts of the substantive value underlying equality rights.
Such disagreement surged to the surface in two cases decided on
the tenth anniversary of the coming into force of s. 15 in 1995:37
Miron v. Trudel 8 and Egan v. A-G. Canada.39 Miron involved a
challenge to a provision of the Ontario Insurance Act setting out a
standard term in automobile insurance contracts which entitled the
spouse of a policy holder to collect under the policy for income loss
due to a car accident caused by the driver of an uninsured vehicle.
The legislative history of the provision made it clear that "spouse"
meant married spouse, excluding common law relationships. Miron
challenged this as a denial of equality. Egan concerned a challenge
to provisions of the Canada Pension Act confining certain benefits to
opposite sex couples (whether married or common law). Egan would
otherwise have qualified for the benefit designed to top up the family
income of elderly couples of whom one had retired and the other was
in low income employment, but was excluded on the basis that he
and his partner were the same sex. He challenged the provision as
discriminatory on the basis of sexual orientation. Neither marital
status nor sexual orientation is a ground actually listed in s. 15.
36. See, for example, R. v. Hess, [1990] 2 S.C.R. 906. By contrast, in
McKinney v. Univ. of Guelph, [1990] 3 S.C.R. 229, the adoption by all members of
the Court of a fairly simplistic conclusion that the simple fact of the use of an
enumerated ground to impose a burden constituted discrimination pushed all the
substantive disagreement between the majority and the dissent into the s. 1 analysis.
The ultimate conclusion that illicit distinctions must not only use an enumerated
or analogous ground, but must also be discriminatory, has brought these arguments
into the discussion of what counts as a violation of s. 15 to begin with.
37. With Thibaudeau v. Canada, [1995] 2 S.C.R. 627, decided at the same
time, these cases constitute a trilogy in which the pervasive disagreements on the
Court about equality became apparent.
38. [1995] 2 S.C.R. 418.
39. [1995] 2 S.C.R. 513.
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In both cases, the Court split three ways-4, 4, and 1. A bare
majority found each of the provisions to be a violation of s. 15, 40 with
L'Heureux-Dub6 J. offering separate reasons for that conclusion.4'
Within the majority on the s. 15 issue, then, there were two different
approaches taken in analyzing discrimination. A minority of four4"
in each case decided that the legislation was not discriminatory,
adding a third approach. The judgments thereby reveal both the type
of distinction lens and the type of impact lens. The minority
judgment of Gonthier J. in Miron appeals to relevance to determine
whether marital status is an analogous ground and therefore
potentially discriminatory. In Egan, given the Attorney General's
concession that sexual orientation is an analogous ground, the s. 15
minority uses irrelevance directly to indicate discriminatory impact
for purposes of s. 15. The disagreement between the McLachlin
approach and the L'Heureux-Dub6 approach in favor of a finding of
a s. 15 violation might be described as a dispute over which of these
two questions-what kinds of distinctions are discriminatory, and
what kinds of effects constitute discrimination-should be the focus
of analysis. In the end, both approaches appeal clearly to dignity for
the first time43 as some sort of touchstone for answering these
questions.
In contrast, judgments finding no discrimination make no
reference to dignity; rather, they argue that legislation violates s. 15
only when the distinction used is irrelevant to the legislative
objective. Working backwards from the characteristics flagged in s.
15 as potentially discriminatory, Gonthier J. characterizes them as
ones commonly used to make distinctions that have little or no
rational connection with the subject matter and as generally reflecting
40. In Miron the same majority denied the s. 1 argument and the provision was
held to be unconstitutional; in Egan, one member of the majority on the s. 15 issue,
Sopinka J., defected on the s. 1 question, so the denial of pension benefits to same
sex couples was found to be discriminatory but upheld. Since my discussion of
these cases is confined to the s. 15 analysis, I will use "majority judgment(s)" to
refer to the five judges who accepted the argument that there was a s. 15 violation,
and "minority judgement(s)" to refer to the four judges who denied the s. 15
violation.
41. The other four members of the majority were McLachlin J., Cory J.,
Iacobucci J., and Sopinka J. McLachlin J. wrote the judgment for this group in
Miron, while Cory J. wrote the s. 15 judgment for the same group in Egan.
42. The other three justices were Major, La Forest, and Lamer, JJ.
43. Although in McKinney v. Univ. of Guelph, [1990] 3 S.C.R. 229, there is
considerable discussion of dignity and whether it is infringed by mandatory
retirement, this discussion tended to come up in the context of the s. 1 argument
rather than in the s. 15 analysis, because all members of the Court were content to
hold that there was a violation of s. 15 simply by virtue of the legislature's explicit
use of age to impose a disadvantage. In retrospect, one can see some of the later
s. 15 disagreements foreshadowed in the s. 1 dispute in McKinney.
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stereotypes." This approach claims that we can identify distinctions
as discriminatory by whether the characteristic used is relevant to the
statutory purpose. However, Gonthier J.'s use of the test of relevance
begs the question rather than answering it. It is trite to observe that
an examination of relevance is meaningless without a determination
of the "functional values underlying the legislation,"''4 or more
simply, the legislative objective. After all, the concept of relevance
refers to the assessment of a mean-ends relationship. We cannot
assess whether the means are good ones without knowing what the
end is. Relevance is therefore not an independent criterion for
diagnosing discrimination or anything else. The relevance of a
criterion for distribution will simply follow from the characterization
of the end. This puts all the weight on the formulation of the
legislative objective; when the statement of the objective itself is
informed by discriminatory attitudes, the distinction used by the
legislature is bound to pass a relevance test but still be
objectionable.46
This is exactly what happens in Gonthier J. 's opinion in Miron
and La Forest J.'s in Egan. That marriages, or at least heterosexual
unions, are foundational to "civilization" is endorsed by both judges,
and the legislation in both cases is taken to be a recognition of this
"fundamental value."47 A legislative distinction designed to foster,
indeed to construct, a form of relationship deemed essential to
civilization is, by definition, relevant to that end.48 Although
Gonthier J. explicitly recognizes that the legislature's objective may
itself be discriminatory, 49 he cannot get past his own conviction that
the state is entitled to foster the traditional marriage relationship long
enough to consider whether that conviction might itself be grounded
in prejudice against alternative family forms. He cannot see that the
undoubted value of the traditional family cannot by itself justify
44. Miron v. Trudel, [1995] 2 S.C.R. 418, 23.
45. Id. at 15.
46. Greschner, supra note 75, at 307.
47. Miron, [1995] 2 S.C.R. at 438-39, 441; Egan v. A-G Canada, [1995] 2
S.C.R. 513, 535-36, 538-39.
48. By contrast, the majority characterized the legislation in both cases as
designed to provide for the needs of economically interdependent family units, andjudged by this standard, holding a marriage license or being of the opposite, is
simply irrelevant to the question of need. For the majority, this is part of the s. 1
analysis, not part of the determination of whether the use of the distinction is
discriminatory.
49. That the legislative purpose must not itself be discriminatory has been
reiterated in Benner v. Canada (Secretary of State), [1997] 1 S.C.R. 358, at 64.
The cases in which the acceptability of the objective is the central issue have an all-
or-nothing quality. If the judges 'see' the discriminatory nature of the entire
scheme, the rest of the legal analysis follows easily; if they do not, the reasoning
upholding the legislation is circular.
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treating other family forms as less worthy.5 ° Thus, the discussion of
relevance begs the central question: is it a denial of equality to
bestow a legal 'seal of approval' on one particular form of family?
Four members of the court evidently think not, but it is not exactly
clear why. An appeal to relevance alone cannot provide an answer.
This question of the proper statement of the objective of the
legislature is simply the issue, from a different angle, of the
appropriate criteria of access to the insurance and pension benefits at
issue. Some sense of the correct principle of entitlement to that
benefit will flow from the characterization of the objective of
distribution. The outcome of this debate will usually determine
whether the distinction used in the legislation is relevant to the
objectives envisioned.5 This should remind us that the s. 15 test
must include reference to a substantive value capable of informing
the characterization of the legislative objective in a principled
manner. In other words, we need a test for when a legislative
objective itself denies equality.
McLachlin J.'s judgment for four members of the majority in
Miron approaches the question through the type of distinction lens.
Her description of the purpose of s. 15 as "prevent[ing] the violation
of human dignity and freedom by imposing limitations,
disadvantages or burdens through the stereotypical application of
presumed group characteristics rather than on the basis of individual
merit, capacity, or circumstance" 52 links the prohibited grounds of
differentiation to dignity. This suggests that the grounds listed in s.
15 were chosen because they have some connection to stereotypes
falsely attributing negative attributes to members of groups identified
by these- characteristics, and this, in turn, violates dignity. To deny
benefits on such a basis is to discriminate. To expand the list, we
should look for other personal characteristics that are used to
stereotype. 3 Four factors already recognized in the case law as bases
50. This point was made forcefully in Canada (Attorney-General) v. Mossop,
[1993] 1 S.C.R. 554, 634, per L'Heureux-Dub6 J.
51. The use of relevance in Gonthier J.'s judgment to assess constitutionality
provoked a strong reaction from both McLachlin J. in Miron and L'Heureux-Dub6
J. in Egan, leading them both to reject it altogether as part of the s. 15 test. This,
however, throws the baby out with the bath water. The way relevance is used by
Gonthier J. and La Forest J. is deeply problematic, but used properly, some form
of assessment of the relevance of the statutory criteria to the objectives sought is an
important part of the s. 15 analysis. Indeed, both McLachlin J. and L'Heureux-
Dub6 J. rely equally heavily on the idea of relevance; it is just that they start from
a different view of the objective of the legislation. They tend to talk about whether
legislative criteria are "appropriate" rather than "relevant" to what they think are
the legislative ends, but the same means-ends assessment is in issue.
52. Miron v. Trudel, [1995] 2 S.C.R. 418, 131.
53. "Logic suggests that in determining whether a particular group
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for the recognition of an analogous ground are then linked to the idea
of the violation of dignity: (1) the historically disadvantaged status
of a group, (2) its minority status, (3) the personal nature of the
characteristic relied on by the legislature, and (4) its immutable
nature. These factors are not necessary and sufficient conditions for
the recognition of an analogous ground, but merely indicate the larger
"unifying principle"54 of preventing the violation of human dignity.
However, the link between dignity and these four factors is
described only very vaguely. The "theme" of violation of dignity,
she says, is "reflected in" these four qualities useful in identifying
new grounds." Nor does her analysis of the case at hand help draw
out the link. She concludes that marital status is an analogous ground
because it exhibits three of the four factors identified as markers of
analogous grounds. First, the choice whether to marry or not is an
important personal freedom, making married or unmarried status an
important aspect of the person. Second, she notes that conjugal
relationships outside ofmarriage have traditionally been disapproved
of and therefore excluded from a host of benefits attached to
marriage, giving common law couples the status of an historically
disadvantaged group. Interestingly, she ties this disapproval to
religious attitudes, thus suggesting that the underlying motivation is
based on prejudice, but this theme is not very well developed.
Finally, she notes that the option of marrying may not be open to a
particular couple or may be beyond the control of any one party
within a couple, muting the mutability of the status of marriage.
Having found these features applicable to the situation of being in a
conjugal relationship outside of marriage, she concludes rather
summarily that "[t]he essential elements necessary to engage the
overarching purpose of s. 15(I)-violation of dignity and freedom,
an historical group disadvantage, and the danger of stereotypical
group-based decision-making-are present and discrimination is
made out."56
Thus, McLachlin J. first suggests that it is the use of stereotype
that violates dignity, but then focuses on the four factors that have
developed as a means of identifying analogous grounds and declares
characteristic is an analogous ground, the fundamental consideration is whether the
characteristic may serve as an irrelevant basis of exclusion and a denial of essential
human dignity in the human rights tradition. In other words, may it serve as a
basisfor unequal treatment based on stereotypical attributes ascribed to the group,
rather than on the true worth and ability or circumstances of the individual? An
affirmative answer to this question indicates that the characteristic may be used in
a manner which is violative of human dignity and freedom." Miron, [1995] 2
S.C.R. 418, 147, per McLachlin J. (emphasis added).
54. Id. at 149.
55. Id. at 148.
56. Id. at 156.
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marital status to be an analogous ground based on the applicability to
it of some of those factors. There is no direct analysis of how these
four factors are related to the problem of stereotyping, nor how, if at
all, the exclusion of common law couples in this case was grounded
in stereotype. Instead, the conclusion that the legislation is
discriminatory is mediated by the application of the four factors that
determine whether a new ground is sufficiently analogous; they are
used as a proxy for stereotyping without the connection being
articulated." In fact, her analysis seems to turn less on a finding that
the legislature inaccurately attributed unfavorable characteristics to
common law couples and more on the suggestion that the traditional
disapproval of common law relationships is grounded in a religious
belief that all other forms of conjugal relationship are immoral." Of
course, one could say that the attribution of immorality to such
relationships is "inaccurate," but this just seems an oblique way of
describing prejudice. Perhaps because the actual case does not turn
on stereotype, as such, she does little to spell out the connection she
sees between stereotype and violation of dignity. 9 The suggestion of
a connection between the sorts of characteristics whose use is
potentially discriminatory, the use of stereotypes, and the violation
of dignity gestures toward an analysis of the grounds of
discrimination in terms of a specific kind of harm done through their
use, but the analysis is incomplete.'
57. In Corbire v. Canada, [1999] 2 S.C.R. 203, McLachlin J., writing with
Bastarache J. for the majority, seems to identify the characteristics that indicate
stereotypes with features of the person that are actually or constructively
immutable. It is not clear what is thought to justify this apparent retreat from an
open-ended, multi-faceted account of the indicators of stereotype in favour of
reliance on a single factor. I am grateful to Hester Lessard for pointing out the
potential significance of this development.
58. The only mention of inaccurate, preconceived notions about common law
couples mentioned in McLachlin J.'s judgment comes not in her s. 15 discussion,
but in her analysis of whether the exclusion can be saved under s. 1. At this stage,
she notes, having decided that the objective of the legislation is to provide for
financially needy families, the exclusion of common law couples seems to be based
on the assumption that such couples are not stable, financially dependent units.
This she finds to be inaccurate.
59. Instead, the same form of words, declaring it wrong to impose "limitations,
disadvantages or burdens through the stereotypical application of presumed group
characteristics rather than on the basis of individual merit, capacity, or
circumstance" is simply repeated at several crucial junctures in the argument.
Miron, [1995] 2 S.C.R. 418, 131. A very similar form of words is used at para.
134, 140, 146, 147, 149, and 156.
60. In Eaton v. Brant County Board ofEduc., [1997] 1 S.C.R. 241, 766-67,
and riend v. Alberta, [1998] 1 S.C.R. 493, $T 70-72, the Court has since stated
that the use of stereotype is not the only means of discriminating. Below, in
articulating a concept of dignity capable of guiding equality jurisprudence I take a
stab at mapping out the various types of discrimination as different ways of
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L'Heureux-Dub J. approaches the question ofwhich distinctions
constitute discrimination by trying to identify the harm of
discrimination, 6 explicitly arguing that a focus on what characterizes
the enumerated grounds and therefore identifies appropriately
analogous ones obscures the central issue.62 In Egan she goes so far
as to treat investigating the ground of discrimination within the s. 15
analysis as merely an instrument-a means of detecting
discrimination as an effect rather than an independent element in the
analysis. 63 Thus, she repeatedly states that discrimination is to be
identified by its effects. The question is: what kinds of effects are
discriminatory ones? We have already established that this cannot be
answered by reference to the effect of the denial of the specific
statutory benefit without making all legislative distinctions
discriminatory. Although there is some slippage on this point in
L'Heureux-Dub6 J.'s analysis, in the final analysis she does identify
some further harm marking a distinction as discriminatory in noting
that the economic consequences of the legislative distinction are
merely symptomatic of the crucial effect-the offence to dignity."
From the outset, she points to s. 15's role in giving effect to the place
of "inherent human dignity" at the heart of individual rights.65
Equality . ..means nothing if it does not represent a
commitment to recognizing each person's equal worth as a
human being, regardless of individual differences. Equality
means that our society cannot tolerate legislative distinctions
that treat certain people as second-class citizens, that demean
them, that treat them as less capable for no good reason, or
that otherwise offend fundamental human dignity.
66
She goes on to cash this out in terms of an entitlement to equal
concern and respect, 67 using this language repeatedly throughout her
judgments on s. 15.
violating dignity in order to try to make sense of the case law so far.
61. The fullest description of her approach is in Egan v. A-G. Canada, [1995]
2 S.C.R. 513 951.
62. She notes in Egan, at paragraph 51, that since not every distinction based
on an enumerated or analogous ground constitutes discrimination, "[a]n additional
dimension of analysis is needed."
63. Egan, [1995] 2 S.C.R. 513, 948.
64. Id. at 9 37; see also id. at 56: "A distinction is discriminatory... where
it is capable of either promoting or perpetuating the view that the individual
adversely affected by this distinction is less capable, or less worthy of recognition
or value as a human being or as a member of Canadian society, equally deserving
of concern, respect, and consideration."
65. Id. at936.
66. Id.
67. Id. at 39; see also her judgment in Miron v. Trudel, [ 1995] 2 S.C.R. 418,
107.
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L'Heureux-Dub6 J. suggests her own two-part framework for the
analysis of s. 15 cases-both the nature of the group affected by the
legislation and the particular interests affected should be examined.
The various factors flagged elsewhere in the case law-minority
status, history of bias against a group, vulnerability, constructive
immutability-are relevant to deciding whether a group was at risk
of having its dignity violated.6 The nature of the concrete
disadvantage imposed by the legislation is examined to see whether
it is significant enough to constitute a violation of dignity. Thus, she
ultimately brings together the two points in the Andrews analysis at
which substantive grounding is needed and ties both to the concept
of dignity. The examination of the nature of the group is an effort to
articulate why characteristics that mark group identity are
problematic bases for legislative distinctions. The exploration of the
interest affected is the means of deciding what sorts of disadvantages
or burdens count as discriminatory. Ultimately, however, the
important interest is respect for one's dignity, rather than interest in
the specific benefit at issue, and the characteristics that are picked out
as problematic are the ones whose use violates dignity.
In both Egan and Miron, the gist of L'Heureux-Dub6 J.'s
argument is that the restriction of the benefits at issue to opposite sex
couples and married couples treats other family forms as less
valuable. In Miron she argues that the explicit choice of marriage is
one way people form intimate relationships of great personal
significance to them, emotionally, socially, and economically; but,
such relationships can be formed in other ways. Commitment can be
expressed otherwise than through the observance of formalities, even
through the gradual cumulative effect of a series of smaller decisions
binding two lives. These other forms of commitment deserve equal
respect from the legal system. In Egan, she concludes that excluding
same-sex couples from the pension benefit sends the message
"essentially that society considers such relationships to be less
worthy of respect, concern and consideration than relationships
involving members of the opposite sex." '69 In ultimately tying the
interest affected to the importance of having one's significant
68. In Miron, [1995] 2. S.C.R. 418, 94, L'Heureux-Dub6 J. introduces what
may be an additional factor indicating that the basis for a legislative distinction is
one that has the effect of discrimination--whether the impugned distinction is
based upon a fundamental attribute of 'personness' or 'humanness."' This factor
is designed to counter the argument that since whether to marry or not is a matter
of choice, it cannot be an immutable aspect of a person's situation and distinctions
based on marital status cannot be discriminatory. Marital status may be able to be
chosen (yet is not always so), according to L'Heureux-Dub6 J., but the choice is
fundamental to one's personality and so deserving of protection against being made
the basis for legislated disadvantages.
69. Egan, [1995] 2 S.C.R. 513, 90.
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intimate relationships recognized as legitimate, L'Heureux-Dub J.
comes closer than the rest of the Court to identifying the crux of the
matter. If the benefit being distributed by the legislation is that
recognition, rather than the money payable under the policy, it is hard
to see how the exclusion of common law and same sex couples could
be read other than as a denial of the equal worth of such relationships.
Although declining to go along with L'Heureux-Dub J.'s
simplified two-part analysis, Cory J.'s analysis in Egan nevertheless
shares much of her essential reasoning. Cory J. appeals to dignity at
two points. First, dignity is invoked to decide that denial of
recognition of same sex relationships can be a denial of the equal
benefit of the law even if this particular couple would not have
benefitted economically from being included in the pension plan
provision.7' Such denial "may have a serious detrimental impact
upon the sense of self-worth and dignity of members of a group
because it stigmatizes them."71  It attributes inferiority to the
excluded group and treats them as less deserving of benefits. Dignity
comes up the second time to ground the argument for treating sexual
orientation as an analogous ground." At this stage, Cory J.'s analysis
draws on some of the factors that had been relied on in past cases, but
not as mechanically as McLachlin J.'s analysis does in Miron. Cory
J. is very clear that the factors pointing to an analogous ground are
not important in their own right, but are only meant to aid in
determining whether the right sort of interest is at stake-the interest
in dignity. Thus, like L'Heureux-Dub6 J., he canvasses both the type
of impact and type of distinction lenses and grounds both in dignity.73
70. Id. at I160-161.
71. Id. at 161.
72. Id. at 171: "The fundamental consideration underlying the analogous
grounds analysis is whether the basis of distinction may serve to deny the essential
human dignity of the Charter claimant." It is interesting that Cory J. places so
much weight on the issue of whether the legislation could be said to be based on an
analogous ground, since according to La Forest J., the Attorney-General of Canada
conceded that sexual orientation is an analogous ground.
73. Much has been made ofthe apparent methodological disagreement between
L'Heureux-Dube J. and her colleagues, even those with whom she often agrees in
result. The disagreement appeared to deepen still further in Vrend v. Alberta,
[1998] 1 S.C.R. 513, in which L'Heureux-Dub6 J. declared,
I do not agree with the centrality of enumerated or analogous grounds in
Cory J.'s approach to s. 15(1). Although the presence of enumerated or
analogous grounds may be indicia of discrimination, or may even raise a
presumption of discrimination, it is in the appreciation of the nature of the
individual or group who is being negatively affected that they should be
examined. Of greatest significance to a finding of discrimination is the
effect of the legislative distinction on that individual or group.
riend, at 185. Although I prefer L'Heureux-Dub6 J.'s analytical framework
because it more carefully ties all the reasoning to the search for violations of
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He outlines the various ways in which gays and lesbians have been
stigmatized, harassed and victimized in the past, including the way
their intimate relationships have been stigmatized, in order to decide
that they constitute a historically disadvantaged group. He then
argues that the challenged provision is grounded in the stereotype that
"homosexuals... cannot and do not form lasting, caring, mutually
supportive relationships with economic interdependence in the same
manner as heterosexual couples."' 4 Given these conclusions, it is no
surprise that he holds that the exclusion of same sex couples from the
pension benefit participates in the stigmatization of same sex
relationships that has long characterized our society in violation of
human dignity.
THE CRYSTALLIZATION OF DIGNITY AS THE SUBSTANTIVE
FOUNDATION OF EQUALITY RIGHTS
With the decision in Law v. Canada (Minister ofEmployment and
Immigration)75 in 1999, the Supreme Court united around the
identification of the missing ingredient in a successful s. 15 challenge
-a showing that legislation violates the human dignity of those
negatively affected by its operation.76 In reviewing the case law up
to this point, Iacobucci J. highlights and ratifies the previous efforts
to connect equality and dignity by McLachlin J., Cory J., and
L'Heureux-Dub6 J. as follows:
* . .the purpose of s. 15(1) is to prevent the violation of
essential human dignity and freedom through the imposition
of disadvantage, stereotyping, or political or social prejudice,
and to promote a society in which all persons enjoy equal
recognition at law as human beings or as members of
Canadian society, equally capable and equally deserving of
concern, respect and consideration. Legislation which effects
differential treatment between individuals or groups will
dignity, I think the differences between her approach and those ofMcLachlin J. and
Cory J. are exaggerated. Making the case for this view is, however, beyond the
scope of the present article.
74. Egan, [1995] 2 S.C.R. 513, 180.
75. [1999] 1 S.C.R. 497. For a sampling of the academic commentary on Law,
see Sheilah Martin, Balancing Individual Rights to Equality and Social Goods, 80
Can. Bar Rev. 299 (2001); June Ross, A Flawed Synthesis of the Law, 11 Const.
Forum 74 (2000); Donna Greschner, Does Law Advance the Cause of Equality?,
27 Queen's L.J. 299 (2001); Daniel Proulx, Les droits a l'ggalitg revus et corriggs,
supra note 24; Beverley Baines, Law v. Canada: Formatting Equality, 11 Const.
Forum 65 (2000).
76. Other cases, such as Vriend v. Alberta, [1998] 1 S.C.R. 493, also invoke
dignity as the ground of the analysis, but it is in Law that the Court made an effort
to develop a consensus on how it operates.
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violate this fundamental purpose where those who are subject
to differential treatment fall within one or more enumerated
or analogous grounds, and where the differential treatment
reflects the stereotypical application of presumed group or
personal characteristics, or otherwise has the effect of
perpetuating or promoting the view that the individual is less
capable, or less worthy of recognition or value as a human
being or as a member of Canadian society.
77
On the meaning of dignity, Iacobucci J. has this to say:
What is human dignity? There can be different conceptions
of what human dignity means .... [T]he equality guarantee
in s. 15(1) is concerned with the realization of personal
autonomy and self-determination. Human dignity means that
an individual or group feels self-respect and self-worth. It is
concerned with physical and psychological integrity and
empowerment. Human dignity is harmed by unfair treatment
premised upon personal traits or circumstances which do not
relate to individual needs, capacities, or merits. It is
enhanced by laws which are sensitive to the needs, capacities,
and merits of different individuals, taking into account the
context underlying their differences. Human dignity is
harmed when individuals and groups are marginalized,
ignored, or devalued, and is enhanced when laws recognize
the full place of all individuals and groups within Canadian
society. Human dignity within the meaning of the equality
guarantee does not relate to the status or position of an
individual in society per se, but rather concerns the manner
in which a person legitimately feels when confronted with a
particular law. Does the law treat him or her unfairly, taking
into account all of the circumstances regarding the
individuals affected and excluded by the law?7
On the basis of his survey of the past case law, lacobucci J.
reformulates the s. 15 test as follows:79
77. Law, [1999] 1 S.C.R. 497, 51.
78. Id. at 53.
79. In the course of this analysis, lacobucci J. also tries to move away from a
rigid, two or three step test for s. 15. "It is inappropriate to attempt to confine
analysis under s. 15(1) of the Charter to a fixed and limited formula." Id. at 82,
88. He acknowledges that there will be some circumstances in which the analysis
that establishes a violation of dignity will take place in the first step of the
traditional analysis, usually described as that of determining whether the law
imposes differential treatment on the claimant by comparison to others, and
sometimes in the determination of whether the differential treatment constitutes
discrimination in a substantive sense, which is itself a matter of deciding whether
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... a court that is called upon to determine a discrimination
claim under s. 15(1) should make the following three broad
inquiries:
(A) Does the impugned law (a) draw a formal distinction
between the claimant and others on the basis of one or more
personal characteristics, or (b) fail to take into account the
claimant's already disadvantaged position within Canadian
society resulting in substantively differential treatment
between the claimant and others on the basis of one or more
personal characteristics,
(B) Is the claimant subject to differential treatment based on
one or more enumerated and analogous grounds, and
(C) Does the differential treatment discriminate, by imposing
a burden upon or withholding a benefit from the claimant in
a manner which reflects the stereotypical application of
presumed group or personal characteristics, or which
otherwise has the effect of perpetuating or promoting the
view that the individual is less capable or worthy of
recognition or value as a human being or as a member of
Canadian society, equally deserving of concern, respect, and
consideration?
Most of the work of an equality rights analysis will be performed
at the third stage of this test. Iacobucci J. collects from the past case
law four categories of "contextual factors" helpful in distinguishing
discriminatory from non-discriminatory legislation through
demonstrating whether a legislative distinction or impact has the
effect of demeaning dignity. The first of these is "pre-existing
disadvantage, vulnerability, stereotyping, or prejudice experienced by
the individual or group.",s The fact that the claimant belongs to a
the basis for the difference is an enumerated or analogous ground and whether it
"has the effect of perpetuating or promoting the view that the individual is less
capable or worthy of recognition or value as a human being or as a member of
Canadian society, equally deserving of concern, respect, and consideration." Id. at
88. Thus, it is the overarching purpose of s. 15(1) of protecting dignity that
should guide the analysis and not any specific set of analytical steps. This seems
to bring him closer to L'Heureux-Dub6 J.'s approach which recommends
abandoning a rigid focus on searching for enumerated or analogous grounds in
favour of asking more loosely whether the legislative distinction violates dignity.
Nevertheless, when Iacobucci J. restates the three "broad inquiries" that a court
should make to determine a s. 15(1) claim, he reverts to describing the first
two-whether there is a formal distinction or a differential impact, and whether it
is based on an enumerated or analogous ground-in rather mechanical terms,
apparently leaving the consideration of whether dignity is violated to the third
inquiry.
80. Id. at 88.
81. Id. at 63.
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historically disadvantaged group may indicate a longstanding failure
by the legal system or social mores to extend equal concern and
respect which the challenged law may perpetuate or further
promote.8 2 Pre-existing disadvantage is also said to be linked to
stereotyping-the use of inaccurate assumptions about the merits,
capabilities and worth of an individual or group which stigmatize
members of a group. 3
The second contextual factor capable of indicating a violation of
dignity asks whether the legislative distinction properly reflects the
actual needs, merits and circumstances of the members of the group
affected by it.84 This factor is used to admonish Parliament not to
overlook actual circumstances by laying down 'one size fits all' rules
that unfairly exclude vulnerable groups.8 5 The third factor identified
by Iacobucci J. is that of whether the legislation seeks to ameliorate
the situation of a more disadvantaged group. In such circumstances,
the distinction used is unlikely to be found to violate dignity.86
Finally, lacobucci J. adopts L'Heureux-Dub6 J. 's idea, articulated in
Egan, that a crucial factor in finding harm to dignity is an analysis of
the nature of the interest affected by the legislation. This makes it
clear that it is not the actual, concrete effect of the legislation that
matters-not the dollars and cents or the specific opportunity,
benefit, or service denied-but rather whether imposing such a cost
on the individual or group implicates dignity." The social and
constitutional significance of the cost to the individual must be taken
into account to make this decision-does it affect membership in a
basic way, deny participation, or constitute a complete failure to
recognize members of a particular group? 8
These factors are all presented as indicators of when a legislative
distinction violates human dignity," yet the analysis of how each is
82. Id.
83. Id. at 64.
84. Id. at 69.
85. Although used to reaffirm the need to take difference into account in the
design of rules, this factor is at risk of collapsing into or at least re-incorporating the
discredited 'relevance' argument offered by La Forest J. and Gonthier J. in Egan
and Miron. See Beverley Baines, Law v. Canada: Formatting Equality, supra note
75, at 71.
86. Law, [1999] 1 S.C.R. 497, 72. InLovelace v. Ontario, [2000] 1 S.C.R.
950, this was apparently watered down so that the fact that legislation is designed
to benefit a disadvantaged group is treated as a counterindicator of dignity violation
even if those excluded from the benefit are just as bad off.
87. Law, [1999] 1 S.C.R. 497, 75.
88. Id. at 74.
89. Proulx, Les droits a 'dgalitg revus et corrigs, supra note 24, 240-55,
usefully notices that these contextual factors divide into two categories: <(facteurs
aggravants>>, or ones indicative of violation of dignity, and ofdacteurs disculpants>>,
ones that are counter-indicative of violation of dignity.
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related to dignity remains underdeveloped. Similarly, the four factors
are said not to be either necessary or sufficient conditions for the
violation of dignity, yet in subsequent cases the factors have tended
to be somewhat mechanically applied. Without the relationship
between the factors and dignity being fully explained, it is the factors
themselves that the Court has tended to rely upon to determine the
outcome of cases.
The decision in Law hinged on whether the use of age in
determining entitlement to the survivor benefits is based on accurate
generalizations. Crucial to this determination is the decision that the
point of survivor benefits is to respond to the long-term income needs
of surviving spouses. This leads the Court to give its stamp of
approval to Parliament's assumption that surviving spouses over the
age of 45 or over 35 if raising children or if disabled will have a
harder time making up for the loss of their spouse's income than
younger and less encumbered people, and that this handicap is
unlikely to diminish over time. By contrast, although a younger or
less encumbered person may well experience short-term economic
dislocation after a spouse's death, this is likely to diminish with time.
"The challenged legislation simply reflects the fact that people in the
appellant's position are more able to overcome long-term need
because of the nature of a human being's life cycle." '9 Therefore, no
stigma attaches to those temporarily denied the survivor benefit;9'
there is no implication that they are less worthy of concern. 92
Law was a fairly easy case on its facts, making it possible for the
Court to unite around the abstract idea that dignity is the substantive
touchstone for equality analysis. Since Law, dignity has been used
more often than not by a majority of the judges to deny equality
claims, 93 giving rise to the fear amongst equality advocates that its
90. Law, [1999] 1 S.C.R. 497, 104.
91. Because the class of persons into which the claimant falls is not a
historically disadvantaged group, Iacobucci J. is not concerned to impose an
extremely high standard of accuracy in his factual assumptions on the government.
However, he acknowledges that other situations may require a stricter standard.
92. There might be a plausible public policy argument that the short-term
economic loss of losing a spouse should be better dealt with by government
assistance programs, but this would have to be formulated not as an argument that
it is discriminatory to refuse a long-term pension to those under 35, but rather that
it is discriminatory to provide for long-term need in these circumstances and not
short term need. On this argument age becomes a proxy for short-term need and
the real question is whether it is demeaning or derogatory to fail to respond to those
in short-term economic need as a result of the death of a spouse.
93. The post-Law cases include M, v. H., [1999] 2 S.C.R. 3, Corbi~re v.
Canada, [1999] 2 S.C.R. 203, Winko v. B.C., [1999] 2 S.C.R. 625, Lovelace v.
Ontario, [2000] 1 S.C.R. 950, Granovsky v. Canada (Minister of Employment and
Immigration), [2000] 1 S.C.R. 703, Lavoie v. Canada, [2002] 1 S.C.R. 769, Nova
Scotia (Attorney-General) v. Walsh, [2002] S.C.J. No. 84, and Gosselin v. Quebec
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very introduction signals a conservative turn in the jurisprudence. It
bears pointing out, however, that if some substantive concept is
needed to ground equality rights, that concept must be at the forefront
of the analysis in any case in which a claim is to be rejected; it will
be the reason why claims fail when they do. However, it should not
be forgotten that it is also the reason why claims succeed. While the
Court has perhaps tended to pay more attention to the concept of
dignity when it is needed to deny a claim than when it serves to
explain why one is upheld, its role on both sides of the argument
must be fully considered in any assessment of its value in equality
jurisprudence. A full analysis of whether dignity is necessarily a
conservative force in equality jurisprudence would require a close
analysis of its use in all the cases since Law. I will not undertake that
analysis here, partly for the sake of brevity, but partly because I think
the Court has been less than helpful in articulating the concept in
such a way as to explain how it functions to justify the denial of
claims. Instead, I propose to start from first principles, constructing
a concept that I think is sound and grows out of the central
considerations that the Court has relied on over the years to guide its
decision-making. Although this concept may not take equality law
as far as some might wish, it is far from an inherently conservative
idea.
DEFINING DIGNITY
Many of the indicators of discrimination identified in the case law
probe the issue through asking whether the personal characteristic
used by the legislation is an acceptable basis for distinction. This, in
turn, opens up the question of what sorts of harm or deprivation s. 15
seeks to prevent, and that question has now been answered by saying
that it is the harm of violating human dignity that s. 15 protects
against. It is an understanding of this harm that must drive the
recognition of analogous grounds; it is equally crucial to
distinguishing discriminatory uses of enumerated characteristics from
non-discriminatory ones; that is, the kinds of impact on people's lives
capable of grounding a s. 15 claim. Harm to dignity becomes itself
a kind of harm, independent of the denial of the specific benefit
distributed by the legislation. We are looking, then, for distinctions
and deprivations that constitute this harm. What, then, is dignity and
how is it violated?
In trying to define discrimination, the early cases repeatedly
returned to several themes or factors which are consciously brought
together and attached to the concept of dignity in the decision in Law.
(Attorney General), [2002] S.C.C. 84. In all of the last six of these, the claim was
denied on the basis that the legislative distinction did not violate human dignity.
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However, the connections between dignity and the developing list of
factors that indicate its violation remain elusive. I will not try,
systematically, to explain or criticize all of the Canadian case law in
terms of my explication of the concept of dignity. Instead, I will
attempt to provide a plausible reconstruction of the most important
features of the Court's analysis of equality. My aim is to show that
a dignity-based analysis has the potential to give equality rights law
some real substance. I do not claim that this potential has always
been lived up to in the decisions to date. It follows from the
analysis I propose that discerning the meaning of a legislative
distinction always relies on a close analysis of the context of the
specific legislation, the benefit involved and the group deprived.
Thus, a complete analysis of the concept of dignity requires a
detailed exploration of all the cases to see how carefully the
contextual factors have been read. The exercise here is designed to
set up that larger task.
A. The Jurisprudence Reconfigured: Three Forms of Indignity
The central insight in a dignity-based account is that valuing
human dignity means acknowledging the inherent worth of human
beings; therefore, violating dignity involves conveying the message
that some are of lesser worth than others. The Supreme Court has,
so far, concentrated on elaborating a list of apparently independent,
though overlapping, contextual factors said to be capable of
revealing violations of dignity. I argue that we can detect in these
factors three forms of indignity or denial of worth that can be
inflicted by a legislature or state actor. The first two are fairly
obvious and explain most of the case law decided so far: the
grounding of legislation in prejudice and the use of stereotype. A
third form of indignity is only slowly emerging: it involves
exclusion from benefits or opportunities that are particularly
significant because access to them constitutes part of the minimum
conditions for a life with dignity. In this case, it is the nature of the
benefit itself that makes its denial a violation of dignity. When
prejudice or stereotype motivates the exclusion from such benefits
and opportunities, the indignity is exacerbated. Our prejudice and
stereotype detectors may be more sensitive to more minor instances
of tainted legislation in such cases.
Any of the three forms can be inflicted through the explicit use
of a characteristic important to personal and group identity, or
through the adoption of uniform, facially neutral standards that fail
to take account of the diverse circumstances of various groups. In
asking how the legislature can convey a message of lesser worth,
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the various factors commonly referred to in the cases then fall into
place as interpretive guides or diagnostic tools for discerning
whether one of these forms is present. This account draws the
conceptual map of equal protection law differently than the
Supreme Court's three part test plus four contextual factors, but I
hope that it enables the development of a more meaningful concept
of dignity.
So far, the Court has dealt most often with the first two forms of
denial of worth, and hence, the factors identified as markers of the
violation of dignity have tended to be ones that should alert us to the
presence of prejudice or stereotype, in society and as reflected in
legislation, or help us to contextualize the harm they do. They are
relevant not in their own right, but because they help us sniff out
prejudice and stereotype. This explains why the Court has
repeatedly stated that the various relevant factors are neither
necessary nor sufficient conditions of a finding of discrimination.94
The presence of these features of context do not constitute
discrimination; they simply help us read the implicit meaning of
legislative distinctions imposing burdens or denying benefits to see
whether it connotes the inferiority of a group. Exhibiting prejudice
and stereotype are core cases of impugning the moral worth of
others. I argue, however, that the Canadian approach understands
what it means to treat another as less valuable not as a subjective
attitude and corresponding psychological consequences, but as an
objective meaning or import arising out of certain forms of
legislative classification.
Further, from the beginning, a link has been made between
stereotyping and its tendency to undermine its victims' "personal
development." '95 This points in the direction of self-fulfillment as a
human good that equality rights are designed to protect, and suggests
a connection between dignity and autonomy. Respect for dignity
includes respect for agency as a fundamental characteristic of
humanity. References to the importance of self-determination or
personal fulfillment recognize human beings as choosers and
planners, as beings with projects and dreams who make
commitments and attachments and at least partly measure their own
sense of worth according to their ability to exercise their capacities
and realize their dreams. Behavior based in prejudice or stereotype
often impairs autonomy. However, there are ways of restricting
self-fulfillment that are themselves sufficiently harmful to constitute
a violation of dignity, even absent an underpinning in prejudice or
94. Law, [1999] 1 S.C.R. 497, 62; Gosselin, [2002] S.C.C. 84, 29, per
McLachlin, C.J.
95. La Forest J. in Andrews v. Law Soc'y of B.C., [1989] 1 S.C.R. 143, 197.
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stereotype. The launching pad for the further development of this
line of thinking is the inclusion of the nature of the interest affected
by the legislation on the list of contextual factors, a factor first
suggested as relevant by L'Heureux-Dub6 J. The idea that we
should ask whether legislation affects membership in society in a
basic way or denies participation in important social institutions
suggests that these forms of participation are crucial in their own
right to a life with dignity.
B. Dignity as Inherent Worth
In some shape or form the concept of dignity has been part of the
foundation of most major modem political and moral theories since
the Enlightenment.96 In its modem guise, its role has been to give an
egalitarian twist to notions of worth that had previously been defined
by hierarchical understandings of relations between people.97 Before
the Enlightenment, worth was identified with honor, which cannot be
equally distributed without destroying its meaning. Those honored
were the social superiors of those not. The introduction of the
concept of dignity democratized or universalized the idea of human
worth. Dignity refers to a somewhat ineffable quality that we ascribe
equally to all human beings in virtue of which we accord them a
special kind of worth. One might say this involves a sort of "leveling
up," raising common people up to the moral status previously
enjoyed only by the aristocracy.
It is commonly said that dignity refers both to a set of empirical
qualities or characteristics and to a moral quality of persons as such.98
When we think of dignity as an empirical attribute, we think, as Aurel
Kolnai suggests, of a range of characteristics having to do with
composure, self-control, invulnerability, and self-assuredness." As
an empirical matter, these are characteristics that individuals exhibit
in greater or lesser abundance, but they point us in the direction of a
characterization of dignity as a moral quality, as an entitlement we
can all claim. For they are all character or behavioral side-effects of
an underlying sense of self that we associate with dignity. They
describe a person who is a self-conscious being with a secure sense
of his or her worth and place in the world, in command of his or her
life and under no one's thumb. To enjoy this sense of worth requires
96. Herbert Spielberg, Human Dignity: A Challenge to Contemporary
Philosophy, 9 Philosophy Forum 39 (1971).
97. Charles Taylor, The Politics of Recognition, in Multiculturalism and "The
Politics of Recognition" 26-27 (Amy Gutman ed., 1992); Spielberg, supra note 96.
98. Aurel Kolnai, Dignity, in Dignity, Character, and Self-Respect (Robin S.
Dillon, ed., 1995).
99. Id. at 57-59.
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that a person be secure in his or her identity as an individual,
including as a member of those communities with which he or she
identifies. He or she must feel a sense of belonging in his or her
society,"° entitled to participate in its institutions and endeavors.
Thus, a secure sense of self requires both confidence in one's identity
and the ability to participate in society. This sense of self-worth can
describe an empirical state of affairs, yet we know that not every
human being is fortunate enough to actually enjoy such a healthy
self-image. We nevertheless think something like this sense of self
is every person's birth right. We therefore ascribe dignity, in this
aspirational sense, in the sense of what each individual is entitled to,
to all human beings.
To ascribe dignity to human beings not as an empirical matter,
but as a moral matter-that is, to treat it as an inherent aspect of
humanity-is to treat human beings as creatures of intrinsic,
incomparable, and indelible worth, simply as human beings; no
further qualifications are necessary.'O In this basic sense, dignity is
ascribed to human beings independently of their particular
accomplishments or merits or praiseworthiness. It refers to a kind of
worth that is not contingent on being useful, or attractive, or pleasant,
or otherwise serving the ends of others. Dignity means worthiness,
but not in the sense of pointing to some other form of value that
makes one worthy. Kolnai nicely captures the non-derivative nature
of this kind of worth:
Dignity means "being worthy of. . . ", the completion that
most aptly suggests itself would seem to be "worthy of being
appreciatively acknowledged as worthy to be thus
acknowledged and appreciated, sans plus." o
Of course, some may be able to jump higher than others, or knit
faster, or may be kinder to their neighbors; nevertheless, there is a
basic respect in which worth is attributed to human beings
automatically, not as a matter of degree, but rather equally to all
persons. Just as it need not be earned, it also cannot be lost. This
deep sense of moral worth is simply part of our conception of the
person. The possession of dignity calls for a particular moral
100. I borrow the language of belonging from Donna Greschner, The Purpose
of Canadian Equality Rights, 6 Rev. Const. Stud. 291 (2002), but use it as a
component of the concept of dignity rather than as a separate purpose informing
equality rights.
101. Immanuel Kant, Groundwork of the Metaphysics of Moral 96 (H.L. Paton
trans., 1964). For an extended account of Kant's view, see Chapter 2 of Thomas
E. Hill Jr., Dignity and Practical Reason in Kant's Moral Theory, 38-57 (1992).
102. Kolnai, supra note 98, at 56. See also Thomas E. Hill, Jr., Social Snobbery
and Human Dignity, in Autonomy and Self-Respect 161 (1991).
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response: respect for the intrinsic worth it signifies. "Humanity," as
Thomas Hill puts it, "should be honored and respected or at least not
mocked, dishonored, or degraded."' 10 3 Out of this can be developed
prescriptions about how to treat others in such a way as to show
respect for their dignity.
As something inherently "possessed" by human beings, dignity
cannot be taken away. It can, however, be dishonored through a
failure to show respect, through the treatment of others as less than
creatures of inherent worth. Thus dignity is violated by such a failure
of respect, whatever the empirical consequences of that failure for
those affected. Harm to dignity need not be contingent upon a
showing of other specific effects, whether psychological or material.
At the same time, violations of dignity do often have psychological
and material consequences, which in turn have implications for the
subsequent ability of people to live in dignity. Dignity may be an
inherent quality of human beings, but a subjective sense of self-worth
is an empirical psychological and emotional state that has enormous
implications for the quality of life. And a person's subjective sense
of self as someone of worth is crucially tied to how she is treated by
others. 4 We may not be able to guarantee that people actuallyfeel
the sense of worth to which they are entitled, but we can aspire to a
state in which empirical realities strive to match inherent moral
entitlements, in which at least it is not state policy that presents the
obstacle to people enjoying the subjective sense of self characteristic
of those whose dignity is respected. To protect dignity, we must be
attentive to the ways in which our treatment of others diminishes self-
respect. These two sides of the equation-how one treats others and
the response that treatment provokes-must both shape our
examination of what the protection of dignity requires.
What it is in the human person that grounds the attribution of
worth associated with the concept of dignity is, of course, an issue of
enormous philosophical dispute, which cannot be finally resolved
here. Nor should it be necessary to have a complete philosophical
account of dignity in hand in order to say something useful about how
the concept can illuminate equality jurisprudence. We are at the
beginning of what should be a continuous process of debate about and
refinement of the concept. The brief account presented here draws
upon several themes in the common currency of thought about dignity
to develop a concept that is attractive and that finds significant
resonance in the key elements of the Canadian jurisprudence.
103. Thomas E. Hill, Jr., Dignity and Practical Reason in Kant's Moral Theory
50-51 (1992).
104. For just two of the manypolitical theorists who have noted this connection,
see John Rawls, A Theory ofJustice 62 (1972); Taylor, The Politics ofRecognition,
supra note 97, at 25-26.
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This account highlights two aspects of human personality in
virtue of which human beings are valued and to be treated as worthy
of respect.. These are not necessarily the only relevant aspects,
simply the two that seem to me most helpful in illuminating the
equality jurisprudence so far.'0 5 First, human beings are capable of
having a conception of the self. This makes respect for identity
crucial to respect for dignity. Second, humans are capable of
formulating and revising a conception of the good. This makes
respect for people's plans and projects relevant to protecting dignity.
These two aspects of personality are connected, since one develops
an identity partly through the life one creates for oneself, and a
conception of the good partly in the context of one's sense of who
one is. Both aspects of personality can be understood as abstract
capacities that all human beings have, but respect for the capacity
requires some measure of respect for its use as well; people must be
given some scope to be who they are and conduct their lives as they
see fit. Some limits on this freedom are inevitable, since it is
obviously possible for people to adopt conceptions of the self and
projects and plans that are unworthy of the approbation or even
tolerance of others. For now, it is enough to note that these limits
will eventually need to be negotiated.
The integration of the exercise of human capacities into the
concept of dignity is meant to ward off an overly abstract
conceptualization whose failure to make room for the particularities
of human experiences of identity and life projects would make
respect for dignity a homogenizing force."0 6 Highlighting these two
105. Indeed, there is an even more basic form of respect for dignity than the one
I explicate here, one which governs treatment of those who may, temporarily or
permanently, be deprived of the capacity for full-fledged autonomy that figures
prominently in the following analysis. This more basic form requires respect for
the integrity and essential needs of the human person whatever his or her capacities,
and is the backbone of any concept of dignity. It may at some point be necessary
to bring this to the surface and subject it to more careful scrutiny and elaboration,
but this has not been necessary in the equality contexts examined in this article.
106. See, for example, Taylor's association ofKantian conceptions of dignity as
grounded in the universal capacity for rational agency with a conception of rights
that insists on uniformity-each individual to enjoy an identical bundle of rights
and entitlements. In The Politics ofRecognition, supra note 97, at 37-44, Taylor
correctly notes that this kind of approach is hostile to any kind of special rights or
any deviation from universality in the interpretation of a given right. I take issue,
however, with his labeling of such approaches as a "politics of dignity," since it
gives the impression that the concept of dignity is integrally tied to this model of
rights. My articulation of an alternative is meant to show that dignity can take
account of the importance of recognizing the capacity for rational agency without
adopting this homogenizing approach. In other words, I seek to unite the two
streams that Taylor labels the "politics of dignity" and the "politics of recognition"
and which he treats as seriously at odds with one another.
2003] 677
LOUISIANA LA W REVIEW
key aspects of human personality also avoids an excessively
individualistic account. Both identity development and formulation
of a conception of the good are undertaken by individuals, but they
are undertaken in large part with and through relationships with
others. 7 For this reason, involvement in communities of various
sizes and scopes can be crucial to the individual enjoyment of self-
worth. That dependency must be recognized by any account of what
respect for the dignity of others requires.
C. Dignity and Equality
It is easy to see how a concept of dignity along the lines sketched
above would be relevant to a range of human rights-how it might
help explain our sense of the inviolability of the physical person, or
the importance of certain freedoms.' Can it also help explain
equality rights?" Remember that equality claims arise in a context
in which the legislature has distributed some benefit and a plaintiff
contests the basis for that distribution. In order to be able to
challenge the chosen distributive criteria, one must be able to point
to some wrong that distribution commits, independent of the denial
of the concrete benefit itself-some independent right that the
exclusion infringes which is best corrected by redistributing the
concrete benefit at issue. To treat dignity as a quality of human
107. This is meant to signal disagreement with Taylor's assumption, in The
Politics of Recognition, supra note 97, at 56-58, that an autonomy focused
conception of dignity must be individualistic in the sense of valuing individual
rights above any collective goals. Obviously, this requires much fuller argument
than I can provide here, but since it seems to me that it is often the perceived
individualism of classic conceptions of dignity that motivate suspicion about the
concept, it is important to at least stake out a conception that is not rigidly
individualistic.
108. David Feldman, Human Dignity as a Legal Value, Public Law [1999], at
682. For a similar exercise in the context of a Canadian-German comparison, see
Dierk Ullrich, Concurring Visions: Human Dignity in the Canadian Charter of
Rights and Freedoms and the Basic Law of the Federal Republic of Germany, 3
Global Jurist Frontiers (2002).
109. It has sometimes been said that the fact that dignity ultimately underpins
all human rights makes it an insufficiently specific value to guide thinking about
equality. See, for example, Greschner, Does Law Advance the Cause of Equality,
supra note 5, at 312; Greschner, The Purpose of Canadian Equality Rights, supra
note 100, at 316-17. I am unpersuaded that the fact that dignity may have
something to tell us about the foundation of the right to security of the person and
freedom of expression etc., means it cannot inform equality as well. A fully fleshed
out concept of dignity should help explain a range of, if not all of, the human rights
typically entrenched in constitutions, just as the value of liberty does. Different
rights will reflect different aspects or dimensions of the concept. However, this
concern is a useful reminder that we need to be looking for the dimensions of
dignity that help with the work of s. 15 in particular.
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beings grounds a principle of entitlement to respect that is fully
universal and which therefore is owed to each equally. In virtue of
having dignity, each person is owed respect as a creature of inherent
worth. This approach does not give us a comprehensive set of correct
principles of entitlement against which to directly judge every
specific benefit distributed through legislation, but rather identifies
an underlying good-respect for dignity-that is properly distributed
in equal shares. In order, then, to find violations of s. 15, we should
look for distributive criteria which, in distributing the concrete
benefit with which they are concerned in a particular way, thereby
fail to accord equal respect to all persons as bearers of dignity, as
persons of equal moral status. Legislation that conveys the
implication that the members of a particular group are of lesser
worth, not full members of society, violates dignity.
1. Prejudice
Let us start with an examination of prejudice to begin an
account of what constitutes a violation of dignity and why. To treat
state reliance on prejudice as wrongful implies that there is some
harm in prejudice. The idea of violation of dignity attempts to
capture this harm. A legislative distinction based on prejudice
denies a class of persons a benefit out of animus or contempt. It
directly connotes a belief in their inferiority, a denial of equal moral
status. Legislated prejudice denies a benefit for the sake of causing
harm to those denied. It thus treats members of a group as loci of
intrinsic negative value, rather than intrinsic moral worth. Such
treatment not only deprives them of the concrete benefit at issue,
but also, through doing so, treats them as unworthy of basic human
respect. It thus constitutes an insult to their humanity or their
dignity as persons. Distinctions that make an important aspect of
human identity the target of stigmatization, humiliation, and the
excuse for deprivation violate dignity in this way.
Prejudice works through the attribution of negative worth to
personal characteristics that are important aspects of identity; it thus
constitutes an assault on the sense of self of its victims. Personal
identity has both an individual and a social dimension. The kinds
of characteristics that people regard as important to their sense of
self tend to be, at the same time, characteristics by which they
define themselves as individuals and through which they identify as
members of a group."0 This group affiliation is as important to
110. Greschner, The Purpose of Canadian Equality Rights, supra note 100, at
298. It should be remembered, of course, that individuals can identify with more
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human identity as any purely individual understanding of the self.
We develop a sense of self only through our interactions with
others, and our most intimate and formative interactions are
frequently with people who share a cultural or ethnic identity that
distinguishes them from other such clusters of people in society.
And we know from our social and political history that it has tended
to be precisely this aspect of identity that has often been targeted for
contempt- individuals have been denied respect through use of a
characteristic identifying them as part of a group that is devalued.
This explains the grounds listed in s. 15 whose use is a likely
indicator of discrimination, and supports the use of a group-based
focus in discerning discrimination. Race, national or ethnic origin,
color, religion, and sex are all aspects of personal identity that are
socially understood as aspects of self in which people are entitled to
take pride, but have nevertheless been used to classify groups as
unworthy. "' Age and mental or physical disability are characteristics
that have been unfairly used to characterize the whole person to the
exclusion of other attributes and capacities, thus reducing the person
to one aspect of his or her identity. Our knowledge of how this has
been done in the past can guide our reading of current legislative
treatment to see if past practices and attitudes are being reinforced,
and can enable us to detect other, unenumerated, ways of
categorizing that threaten to subject members of a group to contempt
in a similar way. The sorts of factors often relied upon to determine
whether a new ground should be recognized as analogous to those
listed in s. 15 operate as more concrete signposts. Thus, the
characteristics that are important to one's sense of self are typically
actually or constructively immutable. Long-term disadvantage is
taken as an indicator, and result, of past prejudices previously
translated into legal disabilities. Status as a chronic minority is a
warning signal because it renders a group vulnerable to such
prejudice.
So far, this description of the wrong of prejudice locates it in the
subjective attitudes of the actor. It is the intended imputation of
inferior moral status that makes action on that basis wrong. If this
was all there were to dignity, ascertaining whether a particular
legislative distinction was constitutional would require an assessment
of what was going on in the minds of the legislators who enacted it
- what they meant by the use of the distinction. There is no doubt
that such subjective intentions to subordinate fellow human beings
constitute a denial of dignity, but this is only a start. Violation of
dignity has meaning not only subjectively, from the legislator's point
than one such group.
11. Id. at304-05.
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of view, but according to the objective or social meaning of certain
forms of behavior, including the use of particular legislative
distinctions. Prejudice makes vivid a specific social meaning of
contempt and therefore a kind of harm not fully recognized
before-being treated as unworthy. Recognizing this should alert us
to be on the lookout for other ways in which lack of respect for
human dignity can be conveyed, including ways in which this can be
done unwittingly. Entrenched prejudice can unleash social forces
that devalue members of particular groups even when those acting
within the practices shaped by those social forces have no subjective
desire to show contempt. The sorts of distinctions and denials that
constitute an infringement on dignity are, then, a matter of social
construction. To understand the violation of dignity in its entirety,
we must look to the meaning of government action, which is always
something that must be socially constructed rather than merely
treated as a matter of one-sidedly plumbing the content of the actor's
mind. Seeing dignity and its violation as socially constructed allows
for the inclusion of stereotype under the umbrella of discrimination.
2. Stereotype
Stereotypes are inaccurate generalizations about the
characteristics or attributes of members of a group that can usually be
traced back to a time when social relations were based more overtly
on contempt for the moral worth of the group. Stereotypes partly
stem from backhanded recognition that acting on prejudice is a
violation of human dignity. Negative characteristics, such as lack of
intelligence, laziness, being fit for some pursuits rather than others,
predisposition to criminality, avarice, vice, etc., which are in fact
distributed throughout the human race, are falsely attributed
predominantly to members of a particular group. It is then the
negative characteristic that becomes the focus of contempt.
Nevertheless, inaccurate assumptions and stereotypes about the
capacities, needs, or desires of members of a particular group can
carry forward ancient connotations of second class status, even if the
legislators did not intend that meaning. The overt hostility may have
come to be washed out of the picture with the passage of time or the
'normalization' of such attitudes, but the implication that those to
whom the stereotype applies are less worthy than others remains.
Once this construction of a group has set in, others are likely to
treat members of that group disadvantageously out of an honest belief
that this merely reflects their just deserts or even simply because that
is how everyone treats them, without ever thinking about the insult
involved. They may even understand their conduct, as with certain
traditional sexist practices, as a positive effort to accommodate the
2003]
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'natural weaknesses' of the stereotyped group. However, neither the
absence of contempt as a subjective matter nor well-meaning
paternalism prevents the use of stereotype from violating dignity. To
be denied access to benefits or opportunities available to others on
the basis of the false view that because of certain attributes members
of one's group are less worthy of those benefits or less capable of
taking up those opportunities can scarcely fail to be experienced as
demeaning because it is demeaning. The message such legislation
sends is that members of this group are inferior or less capable, and
such a message is likely, in turn, to reinforce social attitudes
attributing false inferiority to the group. Legislative distinctions which
are best understood as grounded in stereotype simply do violate
dignity, however well-meaning the legislators may have been.",2
Given that negative stereotyping means the attribution of
inferiority, if legislation is grounded on and stands to reinforce false
stereotypes, to leave it in force would itself reinforce its discriminatory
social meaning. Antecedent good intentions cannot wash that negative
meaning away." 3 In other words, government action, certainly action
in the form of law-making, should not be regarded as a series of
discrete acts to be assessed at the time of the action, i.e. the passing of
particular legislation. Legislators may not have been consciously
aware of the stereotypical assumptions grounding their conduct in
enacting legislation to begin with, but once these assumptions are
brought to the surface through litigation, the issue becomes what
message is sent by continuing to enforce such legislation.
Inaccurate assumptions about the attributes or capacities of a group
are the stuff of stereotype. Such inaccuracy may, in turn, render use of
112. In many every day contexts, we understand the socially constructed nature
of indignity more readily than is often the case in the constitutional context. For
example, in some societies showing another person the palm of one's hand is an
insult. This is the case even if the actor does not intend to show disrespect. On a
first occasion, he might be forgiven the insult--even though the fact of the insult
remains-but if he continues to act this way, no one would accept the excuse that
he does not mean to insult. The meaning of the action is a question of how it is
socially understood, not a matter of the actor's intention. Such social meanings are
open to change-new forms of insult develop and old ones fade in significance.
So, for example, I would argue that the apparently innocent question, "where are
you from" asked of a non-white immigrant to Canada has become an insult because
it has come to stand for an assumption that immigrants do not really belong,
especially if they are non-white. It is the experience of many racialized people in
having to answer the question too frequently, including people who were born in
Canada but are taken to be immigrants, that has turned the question into an insult.
However innocently someone asks it now, it is insulting. Contrarily, it is no longer
taken as insulting to the Irish to refer to a police wagon as a "paddywagon."
113. As Richard Wollheim remarks, "Good intentions in a ruler are of little
interest except in so far as they augur good results." Richard Wollheim, Equality
and Equal Rights, in Justice and Social Policy, supra note 10, at 116.
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a particular characteristic irrelevant to the legislative objective at hand
(assuming to begin with that the objective is a valid one). This
explains why so many of the cases turn on an assessment, within the
s. 15 analysis, of the relationship between the criterion used and the
purported legislative objective. If the proffered objective is not itself
discriminatory, but the criteria used to distribute the statute's benefit
do not serve it very well, it is a signal that the use of that criterion may
well indicate the implicit acceptance of derogatory stereotypes.
Treating violations of dignity as a matter of the social meaning of
certain distinctions also makes it clear that the harm involved is not
primarily a matter of harm to the feelings of those affected by a
distinction. Prejudice and stereotype stigmatize and often humiliate.
The connection between prejudice and the humiliation it often causes
makes it easy to slip into treating the harm to be protected against as
a kind of emotional harm-the bad feelings typically aroused in the
victims ofprejudice and stereotype. But this would be to subjectivize
the nature of the interest at issue. Instead, the harm should be
understood to inhere in the denial of respect per se. In other words,
harm to dignity is better understood as an independent, objective
harm, not a matter of hurt feelings. Feelings of worthlessness may be
a common symptom of being treated with disrespect, and may be
relevant diagnostically, but the evil to be prevented or remedied is
conveying the implication of worthlessness.
This account is roughly consistent with the Supreme Court's
characterization of the appropriate perspective from which to judge
the impact of legislation as "subjective-objective": "the reasonably
held view of one who is possessed of similar characteristics [to those
affected by the legislation], under similar circumstances, and who is
dispassionate and fully apprised of the circumstances.""' 4  The
viewpoint of those affected by the use of a distinction to deny benefits
must be taken into account and the Court must try to put itself in the
shoes of members of this group rather than simply adopting the
perspective of the legislator. At the same time, more than the affected
group's say-so is required. The Court must be satisfied that their
interpretation captures the legislation's real meaning, that its import
is to attribute lesser worth to some group. However, I would register
one note ofcaution: The Court occasionally slips into the language of
"feelings" to describe the appropriate standard-whether the
legislation might reasonably make members of a group "feel"
demeaned or devalued."' Indeed, one might argue that the device of
114. Egan v. A-G. Canada, [1995] 2 S.C.R. 513, 41, per L'Heureux-Dub6 J.
This way of formulating the appropriate perspective was adopted by the Court as
a whole in Law.
115. See, for example, id. at 39 per L'Heureux-Dub6 J.; Gosselin v. Qu6bec
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adopting the perspective of those affected by the legislation, albeit an
objective version thereof, pulls the analysis inevitably in the direction
of ascertaining their feelings and then assessing their reasonableness.
This undoubtedly has the laudable objective of forcing the Court to
take into account the perspective of vulnerable groups, and this is
crucial when the task is to assess whether the import of legislation is
to impugn the dignity of a possibly oppressed minority. However,
unless judges are careful, it risks reducing the question of the relevant
impact of legislation to its psychological effects rather than keeping
the Court focused on the meaning of dignity and its impairment.
In the final analysis, the question of what constitutes a violation
of dignity is a normative question, not an empirical one about
psychological effects. It is the Court's responsibility to make the
normative judgments about the meaning of certain forms of
treatment, not implicitly put the onus on claimants to have
'reasonable' reactions to their treatment. Especially in the case when
a claim is rejected, it seems to me more constructive, or at least less
loaded, for the Court to tell a claimant that he or she is wrong about
the social meaning of the challenged legislation than to imply that the
claimant's feelings are unwarranted or unreasonable. At the same
time, it bears repeating that a court must always be sensitive to the
meaning legislation has for those negatively affected by it in order to
have any hope of avoiding simply ratifying dominant, potentially
oppressive, understandings of social relations. The project of
constructing the concept of dignity is actively normative, requiring
critical reflection on existing social relations. It cannot be reduced
either to a question of the legislature's intentions or to a sampling of
popular opinion." 6
The search for the social meaning of legislation for violations of
dignity requires an interpretive exercise that takes account of the
entire social context within which the challenged legislation operates.
Indeed, we must consider the whole social context because, once we
eschew reliance on the legislator's subjective understanding, it is the
whole context that determines the social meaning of particular
legislative conduct. Neither prejudice nor stereotype typically
operates in discrete, isolated circumstances. Instead the wholesale
classification of a group as unworthy of full moral status, when it is
in force, operates to subordinate members of the group in ways that
stand to affect every comer of their lives, infect every attitude and
(Attorney General), [2002] S.C.C. 84, 245 per Bastarache J.
116. From this perspective, the majority opinion in Gosselin gives reason for
worry. Not only was the question of whether prejudice or stereotyping might have
been operating not very sensitively handled, (see the analysis at footnote 130,
infra), but the majority's deployment of the subjective-objective standard comes
perilously close to collapsing into an assessment of the legislature's bonafides.
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predisposition toward them. The web of restrictions and exclusions
created subjects members of the group to the pervasive message that
the social meaning of the most intimate aspects of their personality
is one of inferiority. The social relations that ensue give birth to the
stereotypes that feed the next round of putative justifications for
continued exclusion. The effects of such pervasive and long term
cramping of the lives of the members of such a group is not easily
undone; the social meaning of imposed inferiority is not easily
eradicated. Even once the most egregious exclusions have been
remedied, the fact of having been associated with a wide array of
negative meanings in the past makes the group more vulnerable to
continued devaluation even as a result of fairly minor exclusions.
Pockets of negative meaning may remain here and there in the law
long after the central institutions of discrimination have been
removed.
This seems to me to be the insight lying behind La Forest J.'s
nuanced analysis in Andrews of the ways that immigrants have been
systematically excluded from the best employment opportunities
throughout much of our past. It is against this backdrop that the
apparently isolated use of citizenship as a criterion for admission to
the legal profession must be read, and against this history it
inevitably takes on connotations of attributing lesser worth to the
non-citizen, even though this sort of use of citizenship has largely
faded from the scene."' L'Heureux-Dub6 J. has shown herself to be
especially attuned to the importance of context and past history in
revealing continuing prejudicial implications of rules excluding
women, gays and lesbians, and other long subordinated groups. Her
judgments have carefully examined the import of current distinctions
against past practices of exclusion. On the other hand, bases for
distinction that do not have such a monolithically negative track
record of being used to subordinate, such as age, do not as easily
attract such a meaning.
The explicit use of the characteristics enumerated in s. 15 or ones
analogous to them is not the only way that prejudice or stereotype can
manifest itself in legislation. Rejecting the adoption of the
legislature's subjective viewpoint in interpreting the meaning of
legislation allows us to see how prejudice and stereotype can operate
117. In Lavoie v. Canada, [2002] 1 S.C.R. 769, the Court had another
opportunity to consider a citizenship-based restriction on employment - this time
with respect to federal civil service jobs. A majority of the Court (seven Justices)
held the restriction to be a violation of dignity. However, the restriction was upheld
because four members of the s. 15 majority found the distinction to be justified
under s. 1, these votes combining in result with the two judges denying a s. 15
violation. The interplay of s. 15 and s. 1 arguments in this case complicates the
dignity issue in ways that go beyond the scope of this article to untangle.
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even in facially neutral legislation. Thus, some adverse impact
claims can ground valid discrimination complaints as instances of the
violation of dignity through the use of stereotype or prejudice. While
not every distinction that has a disproportionate impact on an
identifiable group is ultimately grounded in stereotype or prejudice,
some are. Many adverse impact claims involve situations in which
a facially neutral rule is in fact informed by traditional assumptions
about who is qualified for certain benefits, which assumptions
themselves may be grounded in old prejudices or stereotypes. ' The
qualification may be stated without reference to a criterion like race
or sex and yet be linked to it through using attributes more common
in one group than another. This implicit use of the attributes of a
dominant group in setting criteria for distribution can often be traced
back to an understanding of the enterprise being regulated that more
openly excluded certain groups or simply assumed they were unfit to
participate, even if there is no current conscious intent to continue
past exclusionary practices. In other words, rules that implicitly
appeal to attributes of the dominant group to define who gets access
to benefits can carry forward the meaning of lesser worth rooted in
prejudice or stereotype." 9
3. Dignity-Constituting Benefits
More significantly, facially neutral rules that simply overlook the
circumstances of particular groups can also imply their lesser worth.
If a good case cannot be made for the relevance of the qualification
used, to uphold its use itself potentially sends out a message that the
well-being, the life chances, the opportunities, and aspirations of
those excluded do not count for much. They are allowed to be
outweighed by minor concerns such as the convenience of
maintaining habitual practices. Public institutions and programs
built, even unwittingly, in the image of a dominant group convey the
message that others are not equally entitled to participate in society
and its enterprises, and are not equally members of its institutions.
This kind of indignity depends in part on the significance of the
benefit denied. Every facially neutral rule excludes some group from
118. For a more extended analysis of this phenomenon in the context of gender
biased rules, see Denise G. Raume, What's Distinctive about a Feminist Analysis
of Law?: A Conceptual Analysis of Women's Exclusion from Law, 2 Legal Theory
265 (1996).
119. It follows from this argument that I must disagree with L'Heureux-Dub6
J.'s claim in Gosselin, [2002] S.C.C. 84, 120, that "[a] neutral distinction, or one
that 'unwittingly' yields negative effects, is by definition not premised on a
negative stereotype." An unwittingly negative distinction shows no intention to
discriminate, but it does not necessarily show no stereotyping.
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its benefit. If the exclusive effect cannot be tied back to prejudice
and consequent stereotypes, it is wrongful only if the benefit at stake
is important to a life of dignity.
Again, the point in time to properly assess the social meaning of
the legislation is not the point of enactment, but the point at which its
consequences for the dignity of those it affects have been tested and
recognized. Once the courts have authoritatively decided that the
legislation unjustifiably excludes members of a group from benefits
or opportunities that are constitutive of dignity in our society, the
government cannot seek to uphold the legislation merely because
those consequences were unanticipated or unintended without
thereby cementing the indignity.
The leading Supreme Court decision dealing with an indirect
discrimination claim illustrates how the fact of being left out, even
through mere oversight rather than as the ultimate product of
prejudice or stereotype, can violate dignity. In Eldridge v. British
Columbia Attorney-General, 20 the failure to provide sign language
interpreters for the deaf in hospitals was held to be a violation of s.
15. The relevant legislation and regulations did not specifically
exclude medicare coverage for sign language interpreters; it simply
neglected to include the service. Specifically noting that the Court
"has staked out a different path than the United States Supreme
Court,"'12' La Forest J. proclaimed, "A legal distinction need not be
motivated by a desire to disadvantage an individual or group in order
to violate s. 15(1). It is sufficient if the effect of the legislation is to
deny someone the equal protection or benefit of the law.' 22
Although noting that the disabled have frequently been subjected to
prejudice and stereotyping, La Forest J. recognizes that we do not
require such an explanation of how their needs have come to be
ignored in order to see how that failure creates obstacles to their
participation in society. It is the failure to accommodate their special
needs and the consequences of that failure for full participation that
constitute the discrimination. He borrows the following statement of
the position from Sopinka J. in Eaton v. Brant County Board of
Education:123
Exclusion from the mainstream of society results from the
construction of a society based solely on "mainstream"
attributes to which disabled persons will never be able to gain
access. Whether it is the impossibility of success at a written
test for a blind person, or the need for ramp access to a
120. [1997] 2 S.C.R. 624.
121. Id. at 62.
122. Id.
123. [1997] 1 S.C.R. 241, 67.
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library, the discrimination does not lie in the attribution of
untrue characteristics to the disabled individual. The blind
person cannot see and the person in a wheelchair needs a
ramp. Rather it is the failure to make reasonable
accommodation, to fine-tune society so that its structure and
assumptions do not result in the relegation and banishment of
disabled persons from participation, which results in
discrimination against them.'24
This locates the indignity in the denial of participation in social life
itself, bringing to the surface the third form that a violation of dignity
can take.
The argument depends on the idea that there are some benefits or
opportunities, some institutions or enterprises, which are so important
that denying participation in them implies the lesser worth of those
excluded. La Forest J. argues that interpreters are necessary to give
deaf patients the same quality of care that hearing patients receive." 5
The quality of medical care is certainly important, but this underplays
the violation of dignity involved in this situation. More fundamental
is that without interpreters, deaf patients are denied one of the core
rights ofpersonhood-the right to decide what will and what will not
be done to their body. The idea that people have the right to grant or
refuse consent to medical treatment is fundamental to our concept of
dignity. To deny deaf patients the means of understanding what
medical treatment is being proposed denies them the very possibility
of meaningful consent, and therefore treats them like children,
lacking capacity to decide where their best interests lie.2 6 The insult
to dignity is profound, and it is not mitigated by the fact that the
decision-makers may not have thought about it this way. What
matters is that when we do think about it, we can see that it is simply
unacceptable to treat deaf patients as though their consent to medical
treatment does not matter. It is the participation in the exercise of the
power to give or refuse consent that is the important institution to
124. Eldridge, [1997] 2 S.C.R. 624, 65. For a comprehensive analysis of this
phenomenon in the context of the exclusion of those with disabilities, see M.D.
Lepofsky, Report Card on the Charter's Guarantee of Equality to Persons with
Disabilities After 10 Years: What Progress? What Prospects?, 7 N. J. C. L. 263
(1997); M.D. Lepofsky, The Charter's Guarantee of Equality to People with
Disabilities - How Well is it Working?, 16 Windsor Yearbook of Access to Justice
155 (1998).
125. Eldridge, [1997] 2 S.C.R. 624, 71.
126. Although La Forest J. briefly mentions the duty of physicians to disclose
the risks and benefits of medical treatment, he concentrates more on the fact that the
absence of interpreters may put doctors in the position of being unable to treat deaf
patients without breaching their professional responsibilities than on the denial to
patients of the opportunity to consent or refuse consent. Id. at 70.
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which access is denied by the failure to provide sign interpreters as
much as the receipt of adequate medical treatment.
This point about the importance of participation in key
institutions or access to significant benefits and opportunities can be
generalized. Our conception of human dignity includes the idea that
individuals should have at least a fighting chance of crafting a life for
themselves. Respect for autonomy is part of respect for the inherent
worth of persons. Control over the major determinants of how one's
life goes is part of what gives one's existence meaning and value.
When denial of autonomy is combined with prejudice or stereotype,
the indignity is exacerbated, so that this form of indignity can flavor
the analysis in a case even when, strictly speaking, it is not necessary
to the result. Cutting off significant opportunities because of
prejudice or inaccurate assumptions about those persons being denied
undermines the ambition to make one's own life. It says that some
people are incompetent to shape the character of their life, but rather
should have it dictated to them by others. This is one way to read the
result in Andrews. Work is of fundamental importance to most
people. Choice of occupation is an important part of each person's
definition of his or her life. Access to a particular occupation,
especially one as socially and politically significant as law, should
not be categorically denied on the basis of characteristics that have
nothing to do with one's ability to undertake the responsibilities of
the profession. Treating people according to a stereotyped view of
who they are not only mistakenly underestimates their qualifications;
it participates in a social practice that confines them to a way of life
not of their making, one whose social meaning is bound up with
markers of inferiority. It is hard to see how people who have been so
denied can see themselves and be seen otherwise than as second-class
citizens, especially if such exclusion has been a systemic feature of
their experience. Their lives will reflect a lower level of
accomplishment and worth than they were capable and desirous of,
and this shortcoming is likely to be falsely attributed to them rather
than to the conditions to which they are subjected. This will create
a feedback loop that is likely to lead to future treatment reinforcing
a status of lesser worth.
Even absent prejudice, sometimes the importance of specific
opportunities or benefits to the ability to craft one's own life means
that denying access itself implies the lesser worth of those denied.
The specific benefit distributed by the legislation is seen as a means
to the underlying benefit of autonomy. To the extent that our
conception of humanity incorporates notions of autonomy, we will be
disposed towards the view that our law should at least aim at its equal
distribution. It is clear that equal opportunity to craft a life is denied
when the rules are designed, however unwittingly, in ways that
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prevent the participation of some people in institutions of major
significance to the quality of life. While it may not be possible for
the courts to police this in any very finely grained way, they may
nevertheless respond to the categorical denial of opportunity as a
violation of equality.
Findings of the violation of dignity on this ground may be more
open to contest than ones grounded in prejudice or stereotype. It may
not always be easy to detect prejudice or stereotype, but once it is
acknowledged, the insult in the legislation incorporating it is clear.
The issue of which social institutions and opportunities are important
enough to be regarded as constituting dignity involves still more
delicate interpretive questions. That may be why, in identifying the
nature of the interest affected as one of the factors to be considered
in finding discrimination, the Court has tended to pinpoint as
problematic legislation that "restricts access to a fundamental social
institution," or affects "a basic aspect of full membership in Canadian
society ,"or "constitute[s] a complete non-recognition of a particular
group."' 27 This sets the bar quite high, but we may hope for it to be
lowered as courts develop more familiarity with interpreting this
form of violation of dignity.
So far, this theme has remained relatively underdeveloped in
Canadian jurisprudence. It has the potential to increase the scope of
the equality rights in the Charter. Unfortunately, that potential was
not fulfilled in Gosselin v. Qudbec (Attorney General).' The case
involved a challenge to the social assistance regime in place in
Qu6bec between 1984 and 1989. That regime declared that welfare
recipients under the age of thirty were entitled only to one-third of
the benefits provided to those over thirty. Regular benefits were not
exactly generous, being set at what the government regarded as
subsistence level. Thus, someone under thirty received a fraction of
a subsistence level income. The scheme then provided that younger
recipients could qualify to have their benefits raised by participating
in remedial education programs or job training programs.
Participation in the former would bring one's benefits up to about
75% of the regular benefit, while participation in the latter would put
one on a par with those over thirty.129 In a 5-4 decision, the Supreme
Court held that the scheme was not discriminatory- in particular, it
did not violate the dignity of those under thirty, but was aimed at
supporting their dignity by providing an incentive to young people to
participate in programs that would improve their chances of
127. Lawv. Canada (MinisterofEmployment & Immigration), [1999] 1 S.C.R.
497, 74.
128. Gosselin v. Qu6bec (Attorney General), [2002] S.C.C. 84.
129. See the overview of the scheme provided by Bastarache J. in his dissenting
judgment. Id. at 155-71.
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integrating into the workforce. In the context of the high rate of
youth unemployment in the early 1980s, this was held to be important
to their long term well-being.
The case demonstrates that it is not only indirect discrimination
cases of the Eldridge sort that can exemplify a culpable indifference
to the needs of a particular group serious enough to constitute a
violation of dignity. Gosselin involved the explicit use of age as a
criterion determining the level of social assistance benefits. In most
cases in which an enumerated characteristic is explicitly used, the
analysis revolves around whether its use is grounded in prejudice or
stereotype. The presence of either of these features is sufficient to
decide the case in the complainant's favour (absent s. 1 justification).
The consensus on the Court seemed to be that those under thirty are
not likely victims of prejudice or stereotyping;' hence, if violation
of dignity was to be found it had to be because the benefit denied to
those under thirty could be regarded as important enough to be
dignity constituting.
The majority, in a judgment written by McLachlin C. J., relies
very heavily on the findings of the trial judge that no "adverse
effects" on the claimant or the class she represented' had been
proven. This conclusion seriously misunderstands the nature of the
benefit at stake here that might be classified as dignity constituting.
The majority conclusion is in part based on the fact that the Court did
not have detailed evidence about precisely how many eligible welfare
recipients under thirty might have been denied access to one of the
programs that would have qualified them for a top-up of benefits, nor
130. This issue was not as carefully attended to as one might like, but I will
leave that aside for purposes of the present discussion. Briefly, the conclusion of
the majority that there was no prejudice or stereotyping here was premised on a
refusal to take into account that the group affected by the legislation was not simply
those under thirty, but welfare recipients under thirty. If one asks whether welfare
recipients constitute a group which has historically been subjected to prejudice and
stereotype, and whether this might have led the government to impose a special
hardship on the subset of welfare recipients under thirty, the answer might well be
different. Bastarache J. mentions in passing that the legislation seemed to be
premised on the assumption that those under thirty were in greater need of
incentives to improve their job prospects than those over thirty (Gosselin, at
paragraph 250), but he makes little, in his reasoning, of the insult embedded in that
assumption-that young people are less motivated to pursue self-sufficiency.
Nevertheless, I accept for the sake of argument that if there is prejudicial thinking
lying behind the legislation, it is merely a tinge. The firmer ground for finding a
violation of dignity is in the importance of the benefit at issue.
131. Gosselin, [2002] S.C.C. 84, 46-47. The case was brought as a class
action on behalf of 75,000 persons under thirty eligible for welfare during the
relevant period. The only evidence presented as to concrete effects on individuals
was as to the personal circumstances of Louise Gosselin, the named plaintiff.
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on the exact economic consequences of this.'32 This argument
systematically blurs the question of whether a violation of s. 15 had
been shown and that of the appropriate remedy for any such
violation. Given that the claimant was asking for monetary damages
on behalf of the entire class, one might argue that the quantification
of such damages is impossible without more information about
numbers and precise effects. But that remedial difficulty should not
have been allowed to determine the question of whether there was
a violation of equality rights to begin with. This confusion seems to
have prevented the majority from really grappling with the issue of
whether there was a denial of a dignity constituting benefit here.
In fact, the scheme was designed in a way that certainly placed
those under thirty at risk of deprivation of an important benefit-the
means of basic subsistence. This conclusion is supported by three
features of the scheme. First, there were significantly fewer places
in education and job training programs than there were eligible
welfare recipients under thirty.' Second, there were restrictions on
eligibility for these programs and on their length, making it
impossible for someone under thirty to access the programs
seamlessly and maintain the higher benefit level. Finally, the
government offered no evidence for its hypothesis that the level of
financial need was lower for those under thirty because many of
them had the option of living with their parents. While not everyone
under thirty would suffer under this scheme, that group was at
greater risk of being plunged into abject poverty than those over
thirty; nor was the risk merely hypothetical, as Ms Gosselin's own
circumstances showed. 34 The majority's premature worry about the
appropriate remedy seems to have distracted it from noticing that
there was a real risk here and that for those for whom it materialized
the consequences would be devastating. The real question, then,
was whether creating a serious risk for those under thirty that they
might end up with no more to live on than $170 per month in an
economic context of high unemployment show sufficient lack of
regard for their welfare to qualify as a violation of dignity. It is hard
to imagine how anyone could live a life with dignity under such
circumstances.135 In addition, as Bastarache J. notes in dissent, the
132. Id.
133. The gap was very large-30,000 placements originally established when
there were 85,000 eligible welfare recipients under 30. Id. at 283, per Bastarache
J.
134. Id. at 164-70, per Bastarache J.
135. For a description of the sorts of conditions disproportionately affecting
young female welfare recipients in particular, see Gwen Brodsky and Shelagh Day,
Beyond the Social and Economic Rights Debate: Substantive Equality Speaks to
Poverty, 14 C.J.W.L. 185, 217-20 (2002).
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constant fear of being reduced to such dire straights was itself likely
to impair the dignity of its victims. 36
I would go further still and argue that there is another layer of
indignity inflicted by this legislative scheme. In order to find a
violation of dignity, Bastarache J. focuses mainly on the economic
hardship imposed on those who are unable to rely on their family for
support.137 In so far as he attends to the assumption lying behind the
legislation that many young people would be able to live with their
parents, it is in order to point out that the government provided no
proof of its accuracy and did not make reduction of benefits
contingent on whether parental support was available to an
applicant. 38 This is designed to set up his analysis of what he sees
as the indignity of the scheme-subjecting young people to severe
poverty.' I would argue that the assumption that anyone under
thirty should live with his or her parents if unable to find work
constitutes a violation of dignity even to those who are fortunate
enough to have parents willing and able to provide living
accommodations. It suggests that nothing of any significance is lost
in remaining under parental authority until one reaches the age of
thirty. This surely requires closer examination. In the worst case
scenario, the scheme may have put some young people to the choice
of life in an abusive family situation or abject poverty. Even if we
postulate reasonably healthy relations between young welfare
recipients and their parents, the prospect of living with one's parents
means foregoing any aspiration to an independent life. It means
136. Gosselin, [2002] S.C.C. 84, 256.
137. Bastarache J. wrote the main dissenting judgment on the equality issue,
Arbour J. and LeBel J. agreeing with his analysis. L'Heureux-Dub6 J. wrote
separate reasons concurring with Bastarache J. in the result, focusing equally
strongly on the nature of the benefit-freedom from poverty--denied by the
legislation. Bastarache J. treats the stipulation that those under thirty should get
a reduced benefit as the violation of s. 15 and the creation of remedial programs
permitting one to increase one's benefit to the regular level as the government's
attempt to mitigate the rights violation. He therefore examines the satisfactoriness
of this effort under the rubric of his analysis of whether the impairment of s. 15 had
been minimal so that it can be justified, concluding that the gaps in access to the
remedial programs showed that the impairment was not minimal. This allows him
to treat the right violation more categorically-not as the mere imposition of a risk
of poverty, but as a certainty of poverty. My characterization of the s. 15 violation
has been more modest, considering the entire scheme as a whole, but nevertheless
arguing that the imposition of a real risk of severe poverty on one class of citizens
should be sufficient to conclude that a dignity-constituting benefit has been denied.
138. Gosselin, [2002] S.C.C. 84, n 246-47.
139. Most of this analysis takes place under Bastarache J.'s consideration of the
fourth contextual factor-the nature of the interest affected, confirming my
hypothesis that this fourth factor is likely to be the vehicle for arguments that the
denial of some benefits can themselves constitute a violation of dignity. Id. at IN
251-59.
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postponing until age thirty (or a dramatic turn-around in the
economy) many of the experiences that we regard as formative of
young adulthood; it means retaining a child-like status until age
thirty. This, in itself, constitutes some harm to dignity. This is a kind
of harm that is not acknowledged at all in the majority judgment,
making it easier for it to treat as fatal to the claim whatever
imperfections there may have been in the factual record about the
degree and extent of the purely economic deprivation inflicted by the
scheme.
Although the dissenting judgment of Bastarache J. comes much
closer to seeing the real issue in this case, he sticks very closely to the
conventional post-Law format for equality analysis, and this inhibits
a clear expression of the idea that the third form of indignity that
counts as a violation of s. 15 is the denial of benefits so important as
to be integral to dignity. He proceeds systematically through a
discussion of each of the four contextual factors laid down in Law,
even though the crux of his argument falls under the fourth
factor-the nature of the interest affected. Some of the reasons that
support the conclusion that the interest affected is crucial to dignity
are sprinkled throughout the analysis of the other factors, particularly
the first and second, obscuring their significance. Recognizing that
there are three forms of indignity and that some of the Law contextual
factors are more relevant to some than to others would make it easier
for courts to zero in on the essential features of a particular case.
CONCLUSION
This analysis of equality claims places an enormous
responsibility on the courts, because they are the ultimate arbiters of
the social meaning of the distinctions used to define entitlement to
various benefits. They must decide, and try to justify to the rest of
us, when use of a distinction attributes lesser worth and when it does
not. The Supreme Court has begun to define some of the contextual
features that can help us interpret the meaning of a given legislative
distinction. These are usefully grouped, as suggested by L'Heureux-
Dub6 J.'s suggested framework for analysis, according to whether
they direct our focus to the nature of the excluded group itself or to
the nature of the benefit denied them. The former typically lead us
to reasons to suspect that prejudice or stereotype may have been
operating in the drafting of the legislation. The latter should lead to
a debate over whether the benefit denied is crucial to a life with
dignity.
The key factor coming out of an examination of the group itself
is whether it has been historically marginalized from the mainstream.
The more we are aware of a lengthy past practice of exclusion, the
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more wary we should be that any modem exclusion, even a
seemingly minor one, may reinforce old attitudes and values.
Similarly, the more widespread and systematic past practices of
exclusion have been, the more careful we should be to ferret out any
whiff of continuing attribution of lesser worth. The systemic
imposition of disadvantage can create social dynamics that reinforce
exclusion without being directly tied to the initial contexts of
discrimination. Courts should be alert to ensure that new distinctions
do not contribute to such dynamics because they are as capable of
creating an aura of inferiority around a group as direct imputations to
that effect. Noticing that a group is in a chronic minority status in the
society operates in a similar fashion, since its lesser political power
makes it members vulnerable to victimization. On the other side of
the ledger, the more important a particular benefit is to one's ability
to participate fully in society, or the more it is a marker of true
belonging in society, the more one should worry that exclusion from
it will carry the connotation that members of the excluded group
deserve less respect.
None of this produces a bright line test for discrimination nor a
simply strategy for encouraging better judging. None is possible, or
even desirable. Rigid formulas cannot capture the interpretive
exercise that is at the heart of a determination as to whether equality
rights have been violated. Rather, we more urgently need to begin a
social conversation about dignity and its meaning in our political
culture. Its meaning will vary from one set of social circumstances
to another, making context crucial to the discussion in any given
case. Legal argument should focus on connecting the meaning of
legislative distinctions in the lives of the people they affect to one of
the three forms of indignity and fleshing out the implication of
inferiority they contain. The discrete factors identified by the case
law so far can be used as shorthand when appropriate, but they
should not substitute for an analysis of how the distinction can be tied
back to dignity. It is out of the close study of the political, historical,
and social contexts within which distinctions between groups arise
that we will develop an increasingly rich concept of dignity, one
which will, over time provide increasingly greater guidance to future
courts.
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